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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This Court hasjurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. section 78-2a-3(j) (1996).
This appeal was transferred to the Court of Appeals from the Utah Supreme Court.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
1.

Did the actions of the Board of Trustees with respect to the amendment

of the CC&R's substantially comply with Utah Statutes and the Homeowners Associations'
organizational documents?
2.

Did the trial court abuse its discretion when it denied Plaintiffs'Motion

to Reconsider on the grounds that the Motion presented no 'newly discovered evidence'?
STANDARDS OF REVIEW
(1)

The standard of review on an Appeal from the granting of a motion for

summary judgment is that the Appellate Court accords no deference to the trial court's legal
conclusions of law which are reviewed for correctness. See Schurtz v. BMW of No. Am..
Inc., 814 P.2d 1108 (Utah 1991). The reviewing court may affirm a grant of Summary
Judgment on any ground available to the trial court, even if it is one not relied upon below.
See Higgins v. Salt Lake County, 855 P.2d 231 (Utah 1993).
(2)A trial court's denial of a motion to reconsider summary judgment is reviewed
under Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure for abuse of discretion. See Lund
v.HalL 938 P.2d 285,287 (Utah 1997); In re Determination of the Rights to Use Water. 368
Utah Adv. Rep. 9, 12 (Utah 1999).
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DETERMINATIVE STATUTES
LLC.A. Section 16-6-29. Voting - Quorum
The articles of incorporation or bylaws may provide the number or
percentage of members entitled to vote represented in person or by
proxy or the number or percentage of votes represented in person or
by proxy, which shall constitute a quorum at a meeting of members.
In the absence of any such provision, the members present in person
or represented by proxy shall constitute a quorum at any meeting of
members. The vote of a majority of the votes entitled to be cast by
the members present or represented by proxy at a meeting at which a
quorum was initially present shall be necessary for the adoption of
any matter voted on by the members unless a greater proportion is
required by this act, the articles of incorporation or the bylaws.
U.C.A. Section 16-6-30. Voting - Rights of members
The right of the members, or any class or classes of members, to vote
may be limited, enlarged or denied to the extent specified in the
articles of incorporation or the bylaws. Unless so limited, enlarged
or denied, each member, regardless of class, shall be entitled to one
vote on each matter submitted to a vote of members.
A member may vote in person or, unless the articles of incorporation
or the bylaws otherwise provide, may vote by proxy executed in
writing by the member or by his duly authorized attorney in fact.
Where trustees or officers are to be elected by members, the
governing board by resolution or the bylaws may provide that such
elections may be conducted by mail.
U.C.A. Section 16-6-33. Consent to action without meeting
Any action required by this act to be taken at a meeting of the
members or trustees of a nonprofit corporation, or any action which
may be taken at a meeting of the members or trustees may be taken
without a meeting if a consent in writing, setting forth the action so
taken, shall be signed by all of the members entitled to vote with
respect to the subject matter thereof, or all of the trustees, as the case
maybe.
2

Such consent shall have the same force and effect as a unanimous
vote, and may be stated as such in any articles or document filed with
the Division of Corporations and Commercial Code under this act.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
This is an action brought by Jean and Rebecca Levanger, as a derivative action,
against Highland Estates Properties Owners Association, Inc., alleging that the manner in
which the Associations amended CC&R's were approved was improper and contrary to the
Association's organizational documents and Utah law.
Course of Proceedings and Disposition
Plaintiffs filed their Complaint January 21, 1997. (R. 9.) Defendant Highland
Estates filed its Answer February 26, 1997. (R. 77.)
Highland Estates filed a Motion for Summary Judgment November 26,1997. (R.
198.) A hearing on the Motion for Summary Judgment was heard by the Third District
Court, the Honorable Ronald E. Nehring presiding, on January 9, 1998, two weeks before
the scheduled trial on this matter. (R. 411.) The Court issued an order granting in part
Highland Estates' Motion for Summary Judgment on May 28, 1998. (R. 467.)
Plaintiffs filed a Motion to Reconsider the Decision Granting Partial Summary
Judgment or to Certify the Order as Final and Appealable on July 16, 1998. (R. 479.) A
hearing on Plaintiffs Motion to Reconsider was heard by the Third District Court, the
Honorable Pat B. Brian presiding, on October 7, 1998. At the hearing, the Court denied
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Plaintiffs Motion to Reconsider and granted Plaintiffs Motion to Certify the Summary
Judgment as Final pursuant to Rule 54(b) and (after hearing argument on Plaintiffs
Objections to Form of the Order) signed an Order to effect the Court's ruling on March 3,
1999. (R. 1063.)
The Plaintiffs filed a Notice of Appeal on March 31, 1999. (R. 1074.) The case
subsequently was poured over to the Court of Appeals by Order dated May 18, 1999, and
filed May 20, 1999. (The Order has no Bates stamp in the record on appeal but the index
to the record indicates that it should be page 1145 of the record on appeal.)

***

STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

On or about March 14,1972, Restrictive Covenants ("1972 CC&R's")

of Highland Estates Properties Owners Associations, Inc. ("Highland Estates") were
recorded in the Summit County Recorder's Office amending earlier conditions and
restrictions.

(R. 242-245, 202.) The 1972 CC&R's provide that the CC&R's can be

amended by a vote of a majority of owners of lots in the subdivision. (R. 245.) The 1972
CC&R's are silent as to how and where such a vote is to be taken. (R. 245.)
2.

On or about October 30, 1972, the Articles of Incorporation of

Highland Estates were filed with the State of Utah, incorporating Highland Estates as a nonprofit corporation. (R. 247-248, 202.) The Articles of Incorporation are silent as to the
amending of organizational documents and CC&R's. (R. 247-248.)
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3.

Subsequent to the filing of its Articles of Incorporation, Highland

Estates adopted bylaws. (R. 250-260, 202.)
4.

The bylaws do not specifically require that all voting be done at a

meeting. (R. 251.) However, the bylaws do provide that if a quorum is not present at a duly
held meeting of members, the meeting may be adjourned to a later date. At the reconvened
meeting, the members and proxy holders present constitute a quorum for the transaction of
business. The bylaws also provide that all inaccuracies and/or irregularities in calls, notices
of meetings and in the manner of voting, shall be deemed waived if no objection is made at
the meeting. (R. 251.)
5.

Annual member meetings were attended by very few members. The

lack of attendance made it impossible for the Board of Trustees to transact any business
without holding a reconvened meeting. (R. 203.)
6.

The Board of Trustees, during 1993 and 1994, determined that the 1972

CC&R's needed to be amended. (R. 304.)
7.

In the Spring of 1994, Highland Estate's General Counsel, Scott

Welling, was asked by the Board of Trustees to draft an Amendment to Declarations and
Restrictive and Protective Covenants ("Amended CC&R's"). A draft was presented to the
members in attendance at the Association's 1994 annual meeting held in June, 1994.
Attorney Welling was present at the annual meeting and advised the members present with
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regard to the legal aspects of the proposed changes. (R. 303-308.) There were not enough
members present at the June 1994 meeting to constitute a quorum. (R. 262.)
8.

At the conclusion of the discussions, everyone present voted to accept

the Amended CC&R's and to allow until July 15, 1994 for comment. (R. 262.)
9.

It was suggested, by Mr. Welling, at the June 1994 meeting that the vote

on the Amended CC&R's be undertaken by means of a written ballot, to be delivered to all
members, along with a copy of the draft Amended CC&R's. (R. 262, 305.)
10.

At the suggestion of Mr. Welling, the trustees, and all members present

at the 1994 annual meeting, agreed that the most effective and fair way to inform the greatest
number ofhomeowners of the proposed changes to the 1972 CC&R's was by mail-in written
ballot. (R. 305, 262.)
11.

Efforts to ensure as much input from the owners on the proposed

amendment cost the Association several thousand dollars more in attorney's fees and copy
costs, let alone the time and effort of individual Board members and Officers that would not
have been extended in submitting the Amended CC&R's to members at a reconvened
meeting. (R. 305-306.)
12.

The Plaintiffs were not present at the June, 1994 meeting. (R. 206.)

13.

On August 23,1994, Attorney Welling, on behalf of Highland Estates,

prepared a letter to each member of Highland Estates stating that a copy of the proposed
amendment to the 1972 CC&R's was attached to the letter and a ballot to officially register
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each member's vote of the proposed amendments to the CC&R's. (R. 306.) The letter
indicated that the Amendment had the approval of the Board of Trustees and over forty
homeowners in attendance at the annual meeting in June, 1994. Attorney Welling explained
the purpose of the Amendment and requested that ballots be returned no later than
November 30, 1994. (R. 158,305-307.)
14.

Mr. Welling's letter, along with a ballot and a voting draft of the

Amended CC&R's was to be hand delivered to each of the members of Highland Estates.
(R.305.)
15.

In August, 1994, Plaintiffs received by hand delivery the letter from

Attorney Welling, a voting ballot and a draft of the Amended CC&R's. (R. 205, 233.)
16.

The Plaintiffs did not lodge an objection to the Amended CC&R's, nor

did they vote on the CC&R's. In fact, Plaintiffs did nothing with respect to the CC&R's
until the CC&R's had been ratified by a majority of the members of Highland Estates and
had been recorded in the Summit County Recorder's Office. (R. 205, 233-234.)
17.

In January, 1995, the Board of Trustees of Highland Estates sent a

newsletter to each homeowner stating that the voting period for the Amended CC&R's had
been extended and encouraged members who had not voted to do so. (R. 264.)
18.

The voting deadline of November 30, 1994, was never intended to be

an automatic cut-off date for submission, merely an inducement to motivate homeowners
to act as soon as possible. (R. 306.) A majority of member owners voted in favor of the

7

Amended CC&R's, the vote on the Amended CC&R's was 149 in favor, 26 opposed and
87 who did not respond. (R. 306.)
19.

On September 28,1995, Highland Estates held its annual homeowners

meeting at 7:30 p.m. at the Bums Fire Station. The minutes of the annual meeting reflect
that an announcement had been made that the Amended CC&R's had been approved by the
majority of homeowners, that the ballots would be verified and upon completion, the
Amended CC&R's would be recorded with the County. The sign-in sheet indicated that
Plaintiffs were not present at the September 28, 1995 meeting. (R. 266-267.)
20.

On October 5, 1995, Highland Estates caused to be filed with the

Summit County Recorder's Office, the Amended CC&R's. (R. 270-280.)
21.

On January 16, 1997, the Plaintiffs filed a Verified Complaint and

served the CoEiplaint upon Highland Estates. The Complaint alleged that certain past and
present members of the Board of Trustees had breached their fiduciary duty with respect to
the manner in which the voting was conducted for the amendment to the 1972 CC&R's. (R.
3-4.)
22.

On January 21, 1997, the Plaintiffs caused to be filed in the Third

Judicial Court of Summit County a Motion for Temporary Restraining Order asking the
Court to enjoin the Highland Estate's Board of Trustees from enforcing the Amended
CC&R's, and enjoining the Board of Trustees from convening the meeting of the members
of the Highland Estates which was currently scheduled for January 23, 1997. It was not
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until September 26, 1997, that Plaintiffs noticed a hearing on their Temporary Restraining
Order. (R. 165-166.)
23.

On April 25, 1997, the Plaintiffs through their First Request For

Production of Documents requested the voting ballots which had been submitted by
members on the Amended CC&R's. (R. 1153.)
24.

On May 29,1997, Highland Estates objected to the Request stating that

the information sought was not relevant or calculated to lead to discoverable evidence and
that the information sought was highly personal and proprietary. (R. 1154.)
25.

Following Highland Estate's objection to the Plaintiffs' request for the

voting ballots, the Plaintiffs did not seek to compel the production of the voting ballots.
The Plaintiffs had over six months before the discovery cut-off date of December 21,1997
in which to file a motion to compel the production of the voting ballots. The Plaintiffs failed
to file a Motion to Compel. (R. 1154.)
26.

On September 30,1997, Plaintiffs' Motion for Temporary Restraining

Order was heard by the Honorable Pat D. Brian.

Judge Brian, having reviewed the

documents filed and having heard oral argument, denied Plaintiffs' Motion for Temporary
Restraining Order stating in minute entry that the Plaintiffs had failed to meet their burden
as per the rules. At the hearing on September 30, 1997, Judge Brian scheduled a two-day
bench trial for January 22 and 23,1998 with apre-trial conference set for January 14,1998.
(R. 167.)
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27.

Before the scheduled trial date, Highland Estates filed a Motion for

Summary Judgment which was folly briefed by both the Plaintiffs and Highland Estates.
Affidavits were submitted and the matter came on for oral argument at a hearing before the
Honorable Ronald E. Nehring on January 9,1998. The hearing was held two weeks before
the scheduled trial of January 22 and 23. (R. 1084-1144.) At the hearing the undisputed
evidence before Judge Nehring was that the ballots had been delivered to all members (R.
1132) and that the ballots had been properly counted and a majority of votes received in
favor of the amendment. (R. 1133.) From the bench, Judge Nerhing granted partial
summary judgment to Highland Estates, holding as a matter of law, that the Board of
Trustees acted properly in the amendment of the 1972 CC&R's. (R. 1130.)
28.

At the hearing, Counsel for Plaintiff requested that the ruling be

certified for appeal and Counsel for Defendants so stipulated. (R. 1135-1143.)
29.

On May 28, 1998, the Honorable Ronald E. Nehring issued an Order

granting Partial Summary Judgment for Highland Estates. (R. 467-471.)
30.

The Honorable Ronald E. Nehring issued specific findings of fact and

conclusions of law holding, as a matter of law, that the actions taken by the Trustees of
Highland Estates, that led to the adoption of the Amended CC&R's, were proper and that
the mail-in ballot voting procedures substantially complied with the by-laws and the 1972
CC&R's, and that no prejudice to the homeowners of Highland Estates occurred as a result
of mail-in balloting. (R. 470.)
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31.

Subsequent to the Court's Order granting in part and denying in part

Highland Estate's Motion for Summary Judgment, the Plaintiffs secured the affidavits of
Michael Ferrigno and Christie Bambery on July 8, 1998. (R. 473.)
32.

Mr. Ferrigno indicated in his Affidavit that he had been a property

owner in the Highland Estates subdivision since January of 1994. (R. 473.)
33.

Several months after the issuance of Judge Nehring's Order granting

Highland Estate's Motion for Summary Judgment, Plaintiff Rebecca LeVanger, using her
newly acquired position on the Board of Directors wrongfully secured the voting ballots,
circumventing discovery procedures, and made copies of the ballots. (R. 512.)
34.

On July 15, 1998, the Plaintiffs filed a Motion to Reconsider Judge

Nehring's Order Granting Summary Judgment, or in the Alternative, to Certify the Order as
Final and Appealable Pursuant to Rule 54(b). (R. 479.) Plaintiffs' Motion to Reconsider
was premised upon an argument that the ballots had not been counted properly because some
of the ballots had not been signed by both joint tenants. (R. 479-500.)
35.

On October 7, 1998, after hearing argument on Plaintiffs Motion to

Reconsider, Judge Pat. B. Brian denied the Plaintiff s Motion to Reconsider, finding that the
new evidence submitted by Plaintiffs was available to the Plaintiffs at the time summary
judgment was argued and granted.
36.

Because of the earlier stipulation of the parties, Judge Brian agreed to

certify Judge Nehring's Partial Summary Judgment Order for Appeal. (R. 1063-1066.)
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ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY FOUND, AS A MATTER OF LAW, THAT
THE ACTIONS OF THE BOARD OF TRUSTEES WITH RESPECT TO
AMENDING THE RESTRICTIVE COVENANTS WAS PROPER, AND
SUBSTANTIALLY COMPLIED WITH STATE STATUTES AND THE
ORGANIZATIONAL DOCUMENTS OF THE ASSOCIATION.
A. The Trial Court Applied the Proper Standard of Review of the Actions
of the Board of Trustees.
As the trial court in this matter properly stated "few things are more fundamental
to Corporations . . . than this process by which those entities amend their charters or their
beginning documents." (R. 1130.) Much discussion has taken place in the appellate courts
around the country as to the standard of judicial review which should be given to the actions
of a non-profit governing board, including those of homeowners associations. See
Levanduskv v. One Fifth Avenue Apartment Corp.. 553 N.E.2d 1317, 1321 (N.Y. 1990);
In re Croton River Club. Inc.. 52 F.3d 41, 44 (2nd Cir. 1995). The appellate court in
Levanduskv recognized that competing concerns exist and that the standard for judicial
review of the actions of a homeowners association governing board must be sensitive to a
variety of concerns. Levanduskv, 553 N.E.2d at 1321. On the one hand, there must be some
method of check and balance to prevent members of a governing board from abusive
exercise of their power, while on the other hand, courts must not undermine the purposes
for which the governing board was formed including the "protection of the interests of the
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entire community of residents in an environment managed by the Board for the common
benefit." Id at 1321.
The Levanduskv court concluded that these competing goals were best served by
a standard of review that is analogous to the business judgment rule applied by courts to
determine challenges to decisions made by corporate directors. IcLat 1321 (citing Auerback
v. Bennett, 393 N.E.2d 994 (N.Y. 1979)). The court stated that "a number of courts in this
and other states have applied such a standard in reviewing the decisions of co-operative and
condominium boards." Id. at 1321. The Levanduskv court went on to explain that the
business judgment rule prohibits judicial inquiry into actions of corporate directors "taken
in good faith and in the exercise of honest judgment in the lawful and legitimate furtherance
of a corporate purpose." Ld at 1321; see Auerback. 393 N.E.2d at 999.
Additionally, in Burke v. Tennessee Walking Horse Breeders & Exhibitors
Assoc, et al„ 1997, WL277999 (Tenn. App.), the trial court, in a derivative action such as
this, was asked to declare a vote of the members null and void because the votes had not
been counted pursuant to the governing documents of the Association. Id. at *7-9. The trial
court granted summary judgment for the Association holding that there was a policy against
substituting the judgment of a court for the judgment of a corporate board. Id_The appeals
court affirmed the trial court's decision. Id. The court held that this policy was reflected in
the business judgment rule. Id. at *5, *9. The appeals court, quoting the trial court stated
as follows:

13

The executive committee therefore faced a situation in which the
bylaws could not be applied strictly as written because they could not
ascertain what ballots were in the post office on October 15th. The
executive committee opted for a course of action reasonably
calculated to comply substantially with the bylaws . . . even if the
approach was not the most prudent and was not expressly approved
by the bylaws, it was not forbidden by the bylaws and in fact, was
consistent with the corporation's prior procedure .... This trial court
exercises its discretion not to render a declaratory judgment on the
validity of an election to the board of a non-profit corporation where
the duly responsible subdivision of the corporation determines how
best to conduct an election which is impossible to conduct with
absolute precision under the terms of the bylaws ....

-*—
#
>—

It is particularly inappropriate to entertain a declaratory judgment
action when the complaining parties did not raise the issue before the
executive committee, the full board or the membership at their
meetings ....

^

Idat*14.
It is clear from the record that the trial court in the case at hand applied a standard
of review similar to that standard applied in Levandusky and Burke. From the evidence in
the record at the time of the oral argument on the Motion for Summary Judgment, the trial
court correctly ruled, as a matter of law, that the actions taken by the Trustees that led to the
adoption of the Amended CC&R's were proper. In determining that the Board of Trustees'
decision to seek approval to amend the Restrictive Covenants by mail-in ballot was proper,
the trial court reviewed the objective of the Utah statutes and the organizational documents
in decision making procedures to affect changes and amendments to the organic documents
and determined that the primary objective was to encourage participation and to invite and
solicit the votes of as many members as possible with respect to those issues. (R. 47.)
14

The court found, as a matter of law, that the bylaws were unambiguous in so far
as they set out a procedure for amendment. (R. 47.) The trial court also found, as a matter
of law, that the restrictive covenants, as they existed, did not expressly require that
amendment to the 1972 CC&R's be adopted in the context of a meeting. (R. 47.) The trial
court correctly concluded that the question became: did the alternative voting procedure
substantially comply with the terms of the bylaws and CC&R's. The trial court then
concluded that the Board of Trustees had substantially complied with those provisions. In
so doing, the trial court made a determination based upon the facts in the record at the time
that, as a matter of law, the mail-in voting process provided protections and resulted in no
prejudice to the members. The trial court stated that in so far as the record at that time was
concerned, notice had been provided to everyone who should have received notice. The
court also concluded that there was collateral support in that a majority of'yes' votes came
in indicating that the notice had been provided to the members.
Finally, based upon the record before the trial court, the trial court determined
that the voting process had integrity. There was no evidence that the votes were not counted
properly. Moreover, a majority of homeowners did actually vote for the amendment. The
Plaintiffs offered no evidence to the trial court to dispute that all members had not received
the mail-in ballot, or that the votes had not been properly counted.1 Accordingly, the trial
1

Plaintiffs did not contest these issues of fact until after the summary judgment
hearing. Several months following the hearing Plaintiff attempted to use three affidavits to create
an issue of fact with respect to the manner in which notice was provided to homeowners and the
manner in which the votes were counted. These affidavits became the subject of Plaintiffs'
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court was correct in ruling that, as a matter of law, the Board of Trustees had acted properly
as it related to the amendment of the 1972 CC&R's.
B. The Mail-in Balloting Process Is Not Prohibited by Utah Law.
Plaintiffs contend that the trial court was incorrect for granting partial summary
judgment because Utah law does not allow the amendment of restrictive covenants to be
conducted by mail-in ballot and that Utah law only provides for voting through in-person
meetings. Plaintiffs are wrong. Just the opposite is true, Utah, unlike many other states,
does allow members or shareholders to vote without being present at a meeting.2
The provisions of Utah's Non-ProfitCorporations and Co-operative Association
Act ("Act"), as cited by Plaintiffs, provide great flexibility in the voting process of the
members of a non-profit association. For example, U.C.A. section 16-6-29 (1953 as
amended), states simply, that any number of members present in person or represented by
proxy shall constitute a quorum at any meeting of members.3 Accordingly, U.C.A. section

Motion to Reconsider. Highland Estates has addressed the Motion to Reconsider in Point II
below.
2

U.C.A. section 16-6-30 (1953 as Amended). A member may vote in person or,
unless the articles of incorporation or the bylaws otherwise provide, may vote by proxy executed
in writing by the member or by his duly authorized attorney-in-fact. Where trustees or officers
are to be elected by members, the governing board by resolution or the bylaws may provide that
such elections may be conducted by mail.
3

U.C.A. section 16-6-29. The articles of incorporation or bylaws may provide the
number or percentage of members entitled to vote represented in person or by proxy where the
number or percentage of votes represented in person or by proxy, which shall constitute a
quorum at a meeting of members. In the absence of any such provision, the members present in
person or represented by proxy shall constitute a quorum at any meeting of members. The vote
of a majority of the votes entitled to be cast by the members present or represented by proxy at a
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16-6-29 would actually allow one member to be a quorum at any meeting. Additionally,
U.C.A. section 16-6-30 allows members to vote by proxy. It also allows election votes to
be conducted by mail.
Plaintiffs cite U.C.A. section 16-6-33 for the proposition that all action must be
taken at a meeting of the members unless all members agree to take action without a
meeting. However, a reading of the statute reveals that the only action required to be taken
at a meeting is an amendment to the Articles of Incorporation.4 Nowhere does the Act
require an in-person meeting to take action to amend restrictive covenants or CC&R's. In
fact, the only action required by the Act to be taken at a meeting of members is the
amendment of the articles of incorporation. The Act in no way contemplates an in-person
meeting to take action to amend restrictive covenants or CC&R's. In fact, the Act
contemplates great flexibility by the association and trustees. The Act expressly allows one
of the most sacred of all voting actions the voting related to the election of trustees, to occur
by mail-in balloting. See U.C.A. § 16-6-30 (1953 as amended).

meeting at which a quorum was initially present shall be necessary for the adoption of any matter
voted on by the members unless a greater proportion is required by this Act, the articles of
incorporation or the bylaws.
4

U.C.A. section 16-6-33. Any action required by this Act to be taken at a meeting
of the members or trustees of a non-profit corporation, or any action which may be taken at a
meeting of the members or trustees may be taken without a meeting if a consent in writing,
setting forth the action so taken, shall be signed by all the members entitled to vote with respect
to the subject matter thereof, or all of the trustees as the case may be ....
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Clearly, the spirit of the Act is to allow the associations themselves to control the
inner-workings of the entity. The Act is simply a safety net, requiring minimal procedural
guidelines when none have been provided in the organizational documents of the non-profit
entity.
C. The Organizational Documents Do Not Prohibit Voting By
Mail-In Ballot.
Plaintiffs argue that the organizational documents of Highland Estates, which
existed at the time of the proposed amendment of the 1972 CC&R's, prohibited voting by
mail-in ballot. The organizational documents which existed at the time of the proposed
amendment of the 1972 CC&R's were: (1) Articles of Incorporation; (2) Bylaws of the
Corporation; and (3) the 1972 CC&R's.
First, the 1972 CC&R's themselves contain the following language with respect
to amendment:
These conditions shall run with the land and shall be binding upon all
parties and all persons claiming under them until March 10,1982, at
which time said conditions and covenants shall be automatically
extended for successive periods often (10) years unless by vote of the
owners of a majority of the lots in said subdivision, it is agreed to
change said conditions in whole or in part.
(R. 245.) Nothing in the 1972 CC&R's mandates that the vote on amending the 1972
CC&R's be done at an in-person meeting. Clearly, any reasonable means of securing a
majority vote is contemplated in the language of the 1972 CC&R's.
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Second, while the Bylaws do not specifically address the amendment of
CC&R's, the Bylaws do specifically state that only a majority vote is necessary to decide any
question, unless a different vote is required by statute or by the other organizational
documents.5 Additionally, the Bylaws provide that members and holders of proxies of more
than fifty percent (50%) ofthe total votes of the association constitutes a quorum. However,
if a quorum is not present at a meeting, the Bylaws allow a reconvened meeting to occur and
if properly noticed, whoever appears at the reconvened meeting represents a quorum for the
transaction of business.6 Moreover, all irregularities in the "manner of voting" are deemed
waived if no objection is made at the meeting. (R. 251.)
At the annual meeting of members for 1994, the Amended CC&R's were
discussed in great detail. The Amended CC&R's were discussed page by page with input
and changes from members present. (R. 262.) All members present at the 1994 annual
meeting voted to accept the changes to the 1972 CC&R's and agreed to allow until July 15,

5

Section 2.5 - Voting Requirements. When a quorum is present in person or
represented by proxy at any meeting, the vote of a majority of the membership present in person
or by proxy shall decide any question brought before such meeting .... (R. 251.)
6

Section 2.7 - Quorum. At any meeting of the members, the presence of members
holding, or holders of proxies entitled to cast, more than fifty (50%) of the total votes of the
association shall constitute a quorum for the transaction of business. In the event a quorum is not
present at a meeting, the members present (whether represented in person or by proxy), though
less than a quorum may adjourn the meeting to a later date. Notice thereof shall be delivered to
the members as provided above at the reconvened meeting, the members and proxy holders
present shall constitute a quorum for the transaction of business. (R. 251.)
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1994 for any further input from members. Additionally, the minutes of the 1994 annual
meeting reflect that all members present voted to allow all members not present to vote on
the Amended CC&R's by mail-in ballot. (R. 262.)
No one at the 1994 annual meeting objected to the use of mail-in ballots. (R.
262.) The Plaintiffs admitted in their depositions that they were not present at the 1994
annual meeting of members. They also stated that even after they received the voting ballot
and proposed amendment to the 1972 CC&R's, they lodged no objection to the Amended
CC&R's nor the manner in which the voting occurred. Finally, Highland Estate's Articles
of Incorporation are silent as to the voting practices and procedures of the association.
Clearly, the organizational documents of the association do not prohibit voting
by mail-in ballot. The Bylaws of the association clearly and unambiguously contemplate
great flexibility in the manner of voting and were designed with the clear purpose of
allowing needed changes to occur even if participation was minimal. Additionally, the
Bylaws allowed for flexibility in the manner that voting occurred by providing that all
irregularities in the manner of voting had to be objected to at the meeting or all objections
were deemed to be waived.
There can be no doubt that the trial court was correct in ruling that the board of
trustees acted reasonably and properly in their desire to involve more members in the voting
process, and actually went beyond what was required by the Bylaws in obtaining a true
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majority vote by mail-in ballot. (R. 47-51.) Clearly, the board of trustees substantially
complied with Utah law and the organizational documents of the association.
I) The Trial Court Did Not Incorrectly View Mail-In Balloting as the
Effective Equivalent of Soliciting Proxies.
The Plaintiffs argue that the trial court was incorrectly "persuaded by the
argument that, since proxies are allowed at in-person meetings, mail-in balloting does not
injure any fundamental purpose of governance." (Appellants' Brief p. 15.) The Plaintiffs
have severely misconstrued the trial court's reasoning. As it pertains to proxies, the trial
court simply used the allowance of proxies by the organizational documents to undercut the
Plaintiffs' argument that an actual meeting was necessary to encourage the vigorous
exchange of views. (R. 50.)
The Plaintiffs argue that in-person meetings are necessary to provide meaningful
input on issues and actions. In support of this argument, the Plaintiffs refer to the affidavit
of Christie Bambery. The Plaintiffs' argument is flawed for a number of reasons. First, the
Bambery affidavit cannot be presented as evidence on appeal. The Bambery affidavit was
not part of the record at the time the Summary Judgment motion was argued and ruled upon.
The Bambery affidavit came several months later as part of Plaintiffs' Motion for
reconsideration.
Second, the Board of Trustees did, at the 1994 annual meeting, dedicate the
majority of the meeting to discussing in great detail the proposed amendments to the 1972
CC&R's. The minutes of the 1994 annual meeting reflect that after a detailed discussion,
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every member present at the 1994 annual member meeting voted to accept the changes and
to allow mail-in voting to occur. (R. 262.) Again, the Plaintiffs were not present to provide
vigorous exchange of views. Accordingly, a meeting was dedicated to an in-depth
discussion of the proposed changes to the restrictive covenants and the manner of voting on
the amendment to the restrictive covenants.
The Plaintiffs also argue that the trial court was incorrect in giving any weight to the argument that the balloting process was a better alternative than a reconvened meeting. Plaintiffs' argument is premised on their contention that the 1972 CC&R's could
not be amended by a reconvened meeting. Plaintiffs are arguing from both sides of the
fence. They attempt to use the Bylaws as evidence that an in-person meeting was required
to amend the 1972 CC&R's yet, on the other hand, they argue that the Bylaws have no
application to amending the 1972 CC&R's.
In support of this argument, the Plaintiffs attempt to apply the notion that the
more specific provisions of the 1972 CC&R's controlled over the general provisions of the
Bylaws. It is clear, however, from a simple reading of both provisions, that the Bylaws are
much more specific than the general language of the 1972 CC&R's. The 1972CC&R'sare
silent as to the manner of voting. They simply state that amendment requires a vote of
members owning a majority of the lots. They do not state that the vote must take place at
a in-person meeting. The trial court was correct in finding, that as a matter of law, the
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Bylaws were unambiguous. The Bylaws are clearly more specific than the 1972 CC&R's
as to the voting process.
E. No Genuine Issue of Material Fact Was Before the Trial Court as To the
Integrity of the Voting Process.
Plaintiffs also argue that the mail-in balloting was unlawful because the voting
process was flawed. However, all evidence provided by the Plaintiffs in this regard was
acquired months after the Summary Judgment had been granted by the trial court. The state
of the Record, at the time of the granting of Summary Judgment is clear. There were no
genuine issues of material fact in the record relating to the integrity of voting process. The
facts in the record were undisputed, that adequate notice was provided to all members, that
all votes were properly counted, and that a majority of members eligible to vote did indeed
vote in favor of the amendment. (R. 1133.)
As discussed below, Plaintiffs are precluded from arguing on Appeal that there
is an issue of fact as to whether all homeowners eligible to vote actually received the voting
packet and whether the votes were properly counted. As discussed below, Plaintiffs had
ample opportunity during the discovery process to gather this information and present it to
the trial court in a timely manner for the trial court's consideration when ruling upon
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. Accordingly, the Plaintiffs cannot now raise
the issues on appeal.
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POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT PROPERLY
REVIEWED PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO RECONSIDER.
A. The Trial Court Properly Reviewed Plaintiffs' Motion to
Reconsider Under Rules 54(b) and 60(b).
Plaintiffs claim that the trial court abused its discretion because it did not consider
the probative value of Plaintiffs' Motion to Reconsider. (Appellants' Brief, p. 22.)
Plaintiffs assert that Rule 54(b) required Judge Brian to review the pleadings and evidence
submitted by Plaintiffs before making his ruling.7 (IcL) Such an assertion is not in keeping
with the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure or with Utah case law. Rule 54(b) provides in
pertinent part that in the absence of a final determination and direction, a judgment upon
multiple claims "is subject to revision at any time before the entry of judgment adjudicating
all the claims and the rights and liabilities of all the parties." Utah R. Civ. P. 54(b). Nothing
in this rule requires a trial court to revisit a partial summary judgment. Instead, the rule only
provides that such an order is "subject to" revision. Before revisiting such an order a trial
court must have reason to do so. The reasons for relief from such an order are found in Rule
60(b). See In re Determination of the Rights to Use Water. 368 Utah Adv. Rep. 9,12 (Utah
1999) (holding that in determining whether a trial court has abused its discretion in denying
a motion to reconsider a partial summary judgment, appellate courts look to the standards
7

Plaintiffs further allege that "the trial court incorrectly applied a standard of review
based on Rule 56 ...." (Appellants' Brief, p. 23.) However, there is nothing in the record
supporting the notion that Judge Brian relied on Rule 56. Instead, the record shows that Judge
Brian applied the standards set forth in Rules 54(b) and 60(b). (R. 1047.)
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set forth in Rule 60(b); Lund v. Hall 938 P.2d 285, 287 (Utah 1997); Timm v. Dewsnup.
921 P.2d 1381, 1386 (Utah 1996)). The Rule states in pertinent part:
On motion . . . the court may . . . relieve a party . . . from a final
judgment, order or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake,
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered
evidence which by due diligence could not have been discovered in
time to move for a new trial. . .; (3) fraud . . . misrepresentation or
other misconduct of an adverse party; (4) the judgment is void; (5)
the judgment has been satisfied...; or (6) any other reason justifying
relief from the operation of the judgment. The motion shall be made
within a reasonable time and for reasons (1), (2), or (3), not more than
3 months after the judgment....
Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b) (emphasis added). Without such a reason, it would be pointless for
a
court to review a prior order.
Applying this standard Utah courts have found that "new evidence must be
submitted and it must; (i) be such as it could not with reasonable diligence have been
discovered and produced in opposition to the motion for summary judgment; (ii) not be
merely cumulative; and (iii) be such as to render a different result probable." In re
Determination of the Rights to Use Water, 368 Utah Adv. Rep. at 12 (citing State v.
Goddard. 871 P.2d 540 (Utah 1994) (refusing to grant a motion for a new trial where new
evidence did not meet these standards)); see also Trembly v. Mrs. Fields Cookies, 884 P.2d
1306, 1311 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) (holding that "[a] court can consider several factors in
determining the propriety of reconsidering a prior ruling. These may include, but are not
limited to, when . . . (3) a party offers new evidence"). As Plaintiffs point out, Motions to
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I

Reconsider should be denied when, ain the case of summary judgment, a subsequent motion
fails to present the case in a different light, such as when no new, material evidence is
introduced." Salt Lake City Corp. v. James Constructors. 761 P.2d 42, 43 (Utah Ct. App.
1988); Appellants'Brief, p. 24.

'

In this case, Judge Brian properly reviewed Plaintiffs' Motion to Reconsider
under Rules 54(b) and 60(b). After afoilhearing on Plaintiffs' Motion to Reconsider, Judge
Brian found that:
The record is undisputed that at the time summary judgment was
argued and granted, there was no request by Plaintiffs for a
continuance in order to conduct additional discovery; secondly, there
was no motion to compel discovery either prior to or at the time of
motion for summary judgment; and, three, it is undisputed that
evidence relating to what is now offered as newly discovered
evidence was, in fact, available to the Plaintiffs at the time summary
judgment was argued and granted.
(R. 1047.) Judge Brian, authorized to review Plaintiffs' Motion to Reconsider under Rule
54(b), applied the standards set forth in Rule 60(b) and found that Plaintiffs' Motion
presented no "newly discovered evidence." (R. 1047.) As such, Judge Brian's review of
Plaintiffs' Motion was proper and cannot be considered an abuse of discretion.
Plaintiffs rely on Timm for the proposition that Rule 54(b) requires that the trial
court must examine a Motion to Reconsider on its substantive merits. Timm v. Dewsnup,
851 P.2d 1178 (Utah 1993). Timm involved a Motion to Reconsider which was denied
when the trial court found that such a motion did not exist under the Utah Rules. Id. at
1184. In reversing that finding, the Utah Supreme Court held that "pursuant to the
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provisions of rule 54(b), because the summary judgment was 'subject to revision,' a motion
to reconsider is a reasonable means of requesting such a revision and is therefore permitted."
Id at 1185. However, nothing from the decision shows that the trial court in the instant case
abused its discretion in denying Plaintiffs' Motion. The instant case involves a trial court
which, while recognizing that a Motion to Reconsider exists under the Utah Rules, denied
to grant the motion because Plaintiffs had waived their opportunity to discover the ballots,
and because the ballots did not qualify as 'newly discovered evidence.' (R. 1047.) Such
findings are commonly upheld by Utah courts. See. Salt Lake City Corp. v. James
Constructors, 761 P.2d 42, 43-44 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) (affirming denial of motion to
reconsider when motion did not fulfill the requirements of the 'newly discovered evidence'
Rule).8
The instant case is similar to In Re Determination of the Rights to Use Water, 368
Utah Adv. Rep. at 9. There the Utah Supreme Court heard a case where the trial court had
denied plaintiffs' Motion to Reconsider an Order granting Partial Summary Judgment. Id.
at 12. Though the Plaintiffs had supported their Motion with an affidavit, the trial court
ruled that since the affidavit presented no new evidence the Motion could not be considered.

8

Appellants' citation of Kennedy v. New Era Indus., Inc., 600 P.2d 534, 536 (Utah
1979) is likewise misplaced. There the court explained that Rule 54(b) expressly states that "a
trial judge should have the opportunity for reconsideration in such cases since it facilitates the
just and speedy resolution of disputes in the trial court." Id. at 536-37. While Rule 54(b)
provides a trial judge with the "opportunity for reconsideration," nothing in the Rule provides
that a trial judge must consider a Motion to Reconsider when Plaintiffs present no reason, such as
new evidence, to do so.
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Id In affirming the trial courts' decision, the Utah Supreme Court stated that "[a] trial
court's denial of a motion to reconsider summary judgment is reviewed under Rule 60(b)
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure for abuse of discretion." Id. (internal quotations
omitted). The court found that since the affidavit did not constitute "newly discovered
evidence" the trial court "did not abuse its discretion . . . in refusing to reconsider the
[plaintiffs'] summary judgment." Id.
Though factually different, the instant case presents an identical situation. Here
Plaintiffs asked the trial court to reconsider a partial summary judgment based on evidence
which could have been properly sought prior to the summary judgment ruling. (R. 1047.)
As such, Plaintiffs' evidence does not qualify under the 'newly discovered evidence'
standard required by the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and the Utah Supreme Court.
Because Plaintiffs presented the trial court with no 'newly discovered evidence' the trial
court did not abuse its discretion when it ruled that it could not consider Plaintiffs' Motion.
(R. 1047.); see In re Determination of the Rights to Use Water. 368 Utah Adv. Rep. at 12;
J.V. Hatch Const. Inc. v. Kampros. 971 P.2d 8,11 (Utah Ct. App. 1998); see also Rothwell
Cotton Co. v. Rosenthal & Co.. 827F.2d246,251 (7th Cir. 1987) (holding that for trial court
to relieve partyfroman order on the basis of newly discovered evidence, the evidence must
satisfy the Rule 60(b) requirements).
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B. Plaintiffs Do Not Qualify Under the 'Newly Discovered
Evidence' Standard.
Because the voting ballots do not qualify as 'newly discovered evidence' under
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and because Plaintiffs failed to properly attempt to
discover the voting ballots, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied
Plaintiffs' Motion to Reconsider. The voting ballots do not qualify under this standard for
three reasons. First, the ballots do not qualify as 'newly discovered evidence.' The voting
ballots were the subject of a discovery dispute during which Plaintiffs failed to exercise any
diligence in discovering the ballots. Plaintiffs requested the ballots through their first
request for production of documents. (R. 1153.) Highland Estates objected to Plaintiffs'
request on the basis that the ballots would reveal highly personal information about those
who voted to amend the CC&R's. (R. 1154.) Plaintiffs failed to seek to compel the
production of the ballots and failed to request a continuance in order that they may discover
the ballots. (R. 1045, 1047, 1154.) Following Judge Nehring's Order granting partial
summary, Plaintiffs obtained copies of the ballots only through Mrs. LeVanger's new
position on the homeowners association Board of Trustees. (R. 512.) Thus, Plaintiffs failed
to exercise reasonable diligence to discover and produce evidence which was available to
them. Plaintiffs failed to file a motion compelling production of the ballots. Plaintiffs
further failed to request a continuance granting them more time to discover the ballots. Such
failures can not rise to the level of diligent discovery. Thus, the ballots do not qualify as
'newly discovered evidence.' See Keene Corp. v. Int'l Fidelity Insurance Co.. 561 F.Supp.
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656, 665 (N.D. Ga. 1982) (holding that the moving party must establish that through due
i

diligence the newly discovered evidence could not have been discovered while the summary
judgment motion was pending). As the Keene court has stated:
Motions for reconsideration serve a limited function: to correct
manifest errors of law or fact or to present newly discovered
evidence. Such motions cannot in any case be employed as a vehicle
to introduce new evidence that could have been adduced during
pendency of the summary judgment motion. The non-movant has an
affirmative duty to come forward to meet a properly supported
motion for summary judgment.
Keene, 561 F.Supp. at 666.

'
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Likewise, Plaintiffs failed to provide the trial court with any justification as to
why the affidavits submitted with Plaintiffs' Motion to Reconsider were not filed while
Highland Estates' Motion for Summary Judgment was pending. The Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure preclude Plaintiffs from arguing that the affidavit could not have been produced
at the time the Motion for Summary Judgment was pending. Rule 56(f) provides that:
Should it appear from the affidavits of a party opposing the motion
that he cannot for reasons stated present by affidavit facts essential to
justify his opposition, the court may refuse the application for
judgment or may order a continuance to permit affidavits to be
obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be had or may
make such other order as is just.
Utah R. Civ. P. 56(f). Thus, had Plaintiffs been concerned about the availability of the
affidavits for the court to consider in regard to Highland Estates' Motion for Summary
Judgment, it could have taken the necessary precautions provided by the Rules.

30

In addition, Rule 56(c) requires that motions, memoranda and affidavits
pertaining to a motion for summary judgment "shall be filed and served in accordance with
CJA 4-501." Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). Rule 4-501(l)(B) requires that "the responding party
shall file and serve upon all parties within ten days after service of a motion, a memorandum
in opposition to the motion, and all supporting documentation." Since Plaintiffs did not file
the affidavits with their Memorandum in Opposition to Highland Estates' Motion for
Summary Judgment, the affidavits cannot now be considered. Accordingly, Plaintiffs did
not exercise 'due diligence' in bringing to light the evidence which was discoverable during
the time the Court considered and granted Highland Estates' Motion for Summary
Judgment.
Second, the fact that Plaintiffs failed to fulfill the Rule 60(b) 'due diligence'
requirement in regard to the ballots constitutes a waiver which procedurally precludes
Plaintiffs' Motion to Reconsider. The trial court stated that:
The Court finds that procedurally the Plaintiffs had an opportunity to
either conduct additional discovery, compel discovery that was
outstanding and unresponded to or to seek a continuance for those
purposes. Their failure to do so constitutes a waiver, and
procedurally the Court finds that there is simply no basis for the
setting aside of the summary judgment granted by Judge Nehring in
behalf of the Defendants.
(R. 1047.)
Plaintiffs had over six months in which to attempt to discover the voting ballots.
(R. 1154.) They did not present the ballots to the court until long after the summary
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judgment hearing. (R. 512.) Failure by Plaintiffs to diligently pursue the ballots through
the proper discovery process constitutes a waiver. See Hi-Country Estates Homeowners
Ass'n v. Baglev & Co., 863 P.2d 1, 7 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (reversed on other grounds)
(holding that party's inaction can result in procedural waiver of evidentiary hearing). When
Plaintiffs fail to properly conduct diligent discovery they should not be allowed to
circumvent the discovery procedures and present such evidence after summary judgment.
Such conduct violates the principles of discovery and judicial economy.
Third, Plaintiffs do not qualify under the Rule 60(b) 'newly discovered evidence'
standard because they circumvented discovery procedures in order to obtain copies of the
voting ballots. When Plaintiffs originally attempted to discover the voting ballots,
Defendants objected to their discovery. (R. 1153-54.) Defendants had assured the
homeowners association members that their votes would be held confidential and were
concerned that disclosure of the personal information contained on the ballots could be used
to embarrass or persecute those who had voted for changes in the CC&R's. (R. 1046.)
Plaintiffs then failed to address Defendants' objections and failed to file a motion to compel.
(R. 1047.) Subsequently Mrs. LeVanger was elected to the Highland Estates Board of
Trustees, the very board against whom she had filed suit. (R. 800, 1042.) Mrs. LeVanger
then used this newly obtained position to secure copies of the voting records, despite
Defendants'objections. (R. 1042.) Such behavior constitutes a blatant conflict of interest
in that Mrs. LeVanger knowingly used her new position to obtain records which Defendants
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had specifically objected to her having. Mrs. LeVanger's conflict of interest is especially
apparent considering that she was now a member of the very board against whom she had
filed suit.

(R. 1047.) Mrs. LeVanger's circumvention of the discovery procedures

constitutes unfair surprise and a breach of the principles and procedures underlying the
discovery process. As such, Plaintiffs should not be permitted to present evidence obtained
in such a way, in an untimely manner, when such evidence could have been obtained
through proper procedures before summary judgment.
C.

Plaintiffs Waived Their Right to Object to Judge
Brian's Decision to Hear Oral Argument Without First
Reviewing the Additional Evidence Submitted by
Plaintiffs.

Plaintiffs argue that the trial court (the Honorable Judge Pat B. Brian) abused its
discretion by not reviewing the pleadings or evidence submitted by Plaintiff before making
its ruling denying Plaintiffs Motion to Reconsider. However, the record establishes that the
Plaintiffs have waived any right to object to the court ruling on its Motion without first
reviewing the evidence submitted by Plaintiff in support of their Motion to Reconsider.
Plaintiffs counsel, after learning that the court had not reviewed any of the
pleadings submitted in relation to the Motion to Reconsider, agreed to proceed with oral
argument, without objection. (R. 1041-1042.) Moreover, Plaintiffs counsel agreed, at the
conclusion of the oral argument to submit the Motion for Reconsideration for decision at
that time. Specifically, the transcript of the hearing on Plaintiffs Motion to Reconsider
states as follows:
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The court: Anything further anybody else would like to say before
the court rules? Do you submit? (R. 1047.)
Mr. Sheen: Yes, your Honor. (R. 1047.)
By agreeing to submit the motion to reconsider to the court for decision
immediately after oral argument, Plaintiff has waived his right to "now allege that the trial
court abused his discretion by not reviewing the pleadings submitted." Plaintiffs, surely,
cannot be allowed to agree to submit the Motion to Reconsider to the court for decision,
thereby attempting to lead the trial court into error. Accordingly, Plaintiff should be
precluded from arguing that the trial court abused its discretion by not reviewing the
pleadings prior to ruling on Plaintiff s Motion to Reconsider.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed above this Court should hold that the trial court
correctly found that the actions of the Highland Estates Board of Trustees, with respect to
amending the CC&R's, substantially complied with Utah law and with the Association's
organizational documents. This Court should further hold that the trial court did not abuse
its discretion when it denied Plaintiffs' Motion to Reconsider.
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DATED this pQ

day of September, 1999.
STRONG^ HANNI

Ifaj?-

aul M. Belnap
H. Burt Ringwood
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on this &V day of September, 1999, a true and correct
copy of the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLEE was mailed, first class postage prepaid, to:
E.Jay Sheen
ROBINSON & SHEEN
1366 East Murray-HoUaday Road
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117
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(Whereupon, the following
continued in open

THE COURT:
gentlemen.

proceedings

court:)

Good morning, ladies and

We're here this morning on the Levanger v,

Vincent et al matter, 970300011.
state appearances

Counsel, please

for the record.

MR. RINGWOOD:

Burt Ringwood and Paul Belnap

for the defendant Highland Estates Property

Owners

Association.
MR. SHEEN:

Jay Sheen for the Levangers, your

THE COURT:

Good morning.

Honor

you up here.
going to argue

I've

It's good to have

reviewed your papers, and who's

this?

MR. RINGWOOD:
THE COURT:

I am, your Honor.

You're up.

MR. RINGWOOD:

Your Honor, just as a

preliminary matter, you may or may not know that
this - - that the motion that we filed on behalf of the
Home Owners Association was scheduled earlier in
December

for oral argument before Judge Brian, and,

the day of the hearing, Judge Brian continued

the

4 A r. h

1

hearing because of personal reasons.

And this was the

2

earliest time that we could get another hearing date.

3

And I explain that because, as you know, we

4

have a trial scheduled

5 .

before your Honor, and I didn't want you to feel

6

we were throwing this thing at you at the last minute.

7

THE COURT:

8

MR. RINGWOOD:

9

in this case January

No.

22nd
like

I'm used to it.
Okay.

Your Honor, Jean and

Becky Levanger brought this action naming as

10

defendants in their complaint current and past members

11

of the Highland Estates Property Owners Association,

12

which is a Utah non-profit corporation, and also

13

naming the corporation itself as a party.

14

The complaint alleges two causes of action,

15

both I believe directed at the individual

16

members.

17

in their duties as board m e m b e r s ; and second also a

18

breach of fiduciary duty by alleging

19

mismanagement.

20

board

The first is breach of fiduciary duty, and

gross

The case centers around the approval

and

21

recording of some amended restrictive covenants, and

22

that is the nucleus, or the reason, primary

23

why we're here today.

24
25

reason,

As you know, the Levangers are bringing
action derivatively

for and on behalf of the

Argument:

Ringwood

1 nk'y

this

corporation; in other w o r d s , the action belongs to the
corporation, not to the Levangers.

And any

recovery

belongs to the corporation and not the Levangers.
I'm here today representing

the

corporation

who, along with the Levangers, are the only parties
before this court.
Your Honor, as you note from our pleadings,
we're bringing our motion because we believe that this
action does not meet the procedural

requirements of

Rule 2 3 . 1 .

We've stated in our documents that we do

not believe

-- and the facts are undisputed

the Levangers

-- that

fairly and adequately represent

interests of the members of the Home

the

Owners

Association.
We have set forth in our brief

several

factors that courts look at to determine the adequacy
of representation, and I want to focus on two of those
today.

They are Numbers 7 and 8:
The plaintiff's vindictiveness

towards the

defendants and degree of support the
plaintiff received

from the other members

that he or she purports to represent.
Now, this is not a typical derivative
action situation.

-- derivative

This is not about a majority

shareholder who is accused of self-dealing with the

Argument:

Ringwood
5

1

corporation.

In this situation, all of the members

2

have one vote.

3

all similarly situated.

4

approximately, in this case.

All lot owners have one vote.

They're

There are 260 members,

5

With respect to the issue of vindication, I

6

would just like to review a few facts with your Honor

7

that are undisputed

8

Home Owners Association was established

in 1964 by

9

just a few members at the time, and has

since

in this case.

10

increased

11

elected board of trustees made up of nine members of

12

the association.

13

to approximately

First of all, the

260 m e m b e r s .

It has an

A new board is elected every year, and

14

within the past two months a new board has been

15

elected, and the election occurs at the annual

16

meetings of the Home Owners Association.

17

Now, Jean and Becky Levanger have been

18

members of the association

19

years now, and for many years the association

20

require annual assessments because they were

21

to take care of the roads; primarily

22

for approximately

twenty
did
required

snow removal.

And in the 1980's 1 , I believe, the snow

23

removal was taken over by the county, and the

24

association did continue the requirement of an annual

25

assessment.

Argument:

Ringwood
4 r\ ^ i%

1

And at that time, they did have

2

reserves to cover some of the operating expenses of

3

the association.

4

In approximately

some

1991-92, that timeframe,

5

the association ran out of their reserves, and the

6

duly-elected board of trustees at the time, pursuant

7

to the bylaws, determined

8

to have an annual assessment to meet the operating

9

expenses of the association, and determined

10
11

that it was necessary

again

that

amount would be $37 per year.
And the Levangers opposed

the annual

12

assessments and testified

13

when these annual assessments were m a d e , they

14

determined at that time, back in 1991-92, that

15

timeframe, that they would not attend any more

16

meetings of the association, and refused to make any

17

payment of the annual

18

in their deposition

that

assessment.

There's no challenge of the procedural

19

method in which those assessments were made at the

20

time; they simply decided to take the ball and go

21

home, and that's what they did.

22

For the next several y e a r s , the Levangers

23

attended no meetings of the association, and

24

to refuse to make any annual assessments.

25

Shortly after the board determined

Argument:

continued

that

Ringwood
*
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1

assessments were necessary, they began then working

2

amending

3

they were working under dated back to 1992.

4

they were outdated and they needed to be modernized.

5

the restrictive covenants.

The

covenants
They

So the board, with the assistance of

felt

counsel

6

Scott Welling, who practices

7

amended the covenants with the help of Mr. Welling.

8
9

in Park City, Utah, they

And the amended covenants were actually part
of the meeting of Mr. Welling and the board of

10

trustees at the time, and members of the

11

who attended the 1994 annual association meeting.

12

on

association

Now, some confusion existed as to what

13

procedure was required

14

approved and

to get these amended

covenants

recorded.

15

Mr. Welling advised the board of

trustees

16

that they did need a majority of members to pass the

17

amended covenants.

18

impossibility

19

majority at the home owners meeting, Mr. Welling

20

informed them that they could hold

21

bylcLWS -- a reconvened meeting, and with proper

22

of the reconvened meeting, a majority of members --

23

whoever showed up at the reconvened meeting

24

the majority of the m e m b e r s .

25

get anything done in the association.

And knowing that it was an

for the association to get out a

Argument:

- - pursuant to the
notice

represents

That's the fallback to

Ringwood

1GiU

The board was concerned about their method
of having a reconvened meeting with respect to the
covenants, because they wanted everybody in the
association
necessary

-- even though it wasn't

-- they wanted everybody

opportunity

technically

to have an

to vote on the amended CC&R's.

They expressed
a reconvened meeting.

the concern with the idea of

Mr. Welling then proposed

they conduct a vote by m a i l .
board and was introduced

that

So it was decided by the

to the members at the 1994 --

in attendance at the 1994 annual meeting, that they
would vote on the CC&R's by m a i l , in ballot; and it
was agreed at that meeting that they would do that.
So, subsequent to the 1994 annual meeting,
each home owner received, by hand delivery, a letter
from Attorney Welling explaining

the circumstances

and

a voting draft of the amended covenants, and a voting
ballot, with instructions

from Mr. Welling as to how

to vote, and to mail in those votes.
THE COURT:

I didn't see a copy of those

papers as exhibits to your pleadings.
MR. RINGWOOD:
THE COURT:

Of the actual --

Of the Welling

draft CC&R's that went out pursuant

letter and of the
to the

'94

meeting.

Argument;

Ringwood
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1

MR. RINGWOOD:

Yeah, I don't see it, either,

2

your Honor.

3

Honor.

4

copy - - but the letter itself explained what

5

CC&R's were, discussed the amendments

6

then explained voting procedures

7

then there was a voting copy of the CC&R's attached

8

the letter, along with the ballot.

9

We do have copies of that to get to your

The letter itself

-- maybe Mr. Sheen has a

The Levangers admitted

the

to the CC&R's,

to the members.

in their

And

depositions

10

that they received, by hand delivery, a copy of the

11

Welling letter, the voting draft of the amended

12

covenants, and the ballot.

13

to

As stated in their deposition, they chose to

14

do nothing with it.

15

didn't vote against it; they just simply ignored

16

ballot and did not discuss their concerns with any

17

board members at the time, and just simply ignored it.

18

They didn't vote for it, they
the

After several m o n t h s , a majority of members

19

had approved the amended covenants by mail-in vote.

20

At the annual meeting

21

Levangers did not attend

22

majority vote had been received and that the amended

23

covenant would be recorded, and they were forwarded to

24

the Recorder in October of 1995.

25

in 1995 -- which, again, the
-- the board announced that a

Shortly after they were recorded, it was

Argument:

Ringwood
10

1 nm

1

brought to the attention of the board that they had

2

inadvertently recorded a draft copy and left out a

3

provision that they felt was important, so then they

4

subsequently

5

filed an amendment.

THE COURT:

There has been much to do over

6

this omitted clause in the CC&R's.

7

about?

8
9
10
11
12

MR. RINGWOOD:

What was that

It was simply just an

oversight.
THE COURT:

What was the substance of the

provision?
MR. RINGWOOD:

W e l l , the provision

itself

13

that was omitted was the provision which provided --

14

it was basically stated that if you use the horse

15

trail, that you do so at your own risk, and that the

16

association won't be liable for harm that might

17

on those trails.

18

So, the board obviously

occur

thought it was

19

important; that's why they thought it -- that's why

20

they put it in.

21

it was part of the CC&R's.

22

And they made sure it got recorded

so

So, after the recording of the CC&R's in

23

1995, the Levangers still had no involvement, voiced

24

no concern, and simply refused to participate in the

25

association.

It wasn't until January of

Argument:

'96, at which

Ringwood
11

Ifl^l

1

time the Levangers received a demand notice from the

2

association that they were five years in arrears --

3

four years in arrears on the payment of their $37

4

annual fee for the two lots that they owned, and

5

demanded payment from the Levangers.

6

The Levangers continued

to refuse to make

7

payment, and in June of 1996, the association

8

lien on their property; and, at which time, the

9

Levangers hired an attorney and brought this action.

10

Your Honor, with that background

filed a

in place,

11

it's our contention that Rule 2 3 . 1 , which is the rule

12

that allows a derivative action to be brought, is

13

designed to protect against exactly what's

14

here .

15

happened

And part of the safety net that is in that

16

provision requires that if there's any appearance

17

plaintiffs in the action do not fairly and

18

represent the interests of other members who are

19

similarly situated, that the action cannot be

20

maintained.

21

And it's our opinion

adequately

-- and I think

22

facts support it -- that the Levangers do not

23

and adequately represent

24

members in the association.

25

the
fairly

the interests of the other

Now, the need for fair and

Argument:

that

adequate

Ringwood
12

1ftAS

1

representation, in my opinion, your Honor, is

2

absolutely critical in a case like this involving a

3

non-profit

4

corporation.
There are no monetary damages alleged here,

5

and we have two disgruntled home owners, basically,

6

who are asking this court to substitute

7

for the judgment of the duly appointed board of

8

directors and a majority of the members who have voted

9

to approve the CC&R's.

10

their

judgment

Additionally, your Honor, derivative

actions

11

are designed to benefit the corporation.

There's no

12

benefit to the corporation in this case.

There are

13

two parties before the court in this action.

14

And, thirdly, the rights of all the members

15

are being determined and advocated by these two

16

members.

17

So, it's a very important part of Rule 2 3 . 1 .
Clearly, the facts of this case

indicate

18

that this case is nothing more than an attempt by the

19

Levangers to get even for placing a lien on their

20

property.

21

They had ample opportunity during the time

22

that the CC&R's were being developed, the amended

23

covenants were being developed, to voice concern, to

24

put input into those amended covenants, and they chose

25

not to.

They chose not to participate.

Argument;

Ringwood
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1

It wasn't until after a demand was made on

2

them for their association dues that they voiced

3

concern.

4

Your Honor, they are claiming
-- amended CC&R's, are being

that the

5

CC&R's

6

unlawfully, that they're being

7

indiscriminately.

8

amended CC&R's have even been enforced yet.

9

any

enforced

enforced

There's no evidence that the

The Levangers are mistaken.

They mistakenly

10

believe that the CC&R's were used to place a lien upon

11

their property.

12

the 1980's provide that a lien can be placed

13

property

14

they don't pay their dues, and that's what the board

15

did.

16

lien upon the property.

17

The bylaws that have existed

for members

since
upon

-- against m e m b e r s ' property

It simply relied upon the bylaws and placed

if

the

Now, after the lien was placed upon the

18

property, the Levangers immediately hired an attorney.

19

The board has explained, in Mr. Welling's

20

when they found out it was going to cost them $75 to

21

place the liens, $75 apiece to place liens upon all

22

the property, Mr. Welling

23

how to do one."

24
25

He did one.

affidavit,

said, "well, I'll

show you

They chose the Levangers, who

refused to pay their dues from the very

Argument:

inception.

Ringwood
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1

And at that point in time, with the hiring of the

2

attorney, the imminent lawsuit, the board did not

3

place any more liens on anybody else's property.

4

And not to make a lot to do about that, your

5

Honor, but the fact of the matter is that the

6

Levangers have refused pay their dues, and the

7

association has a right to lien their property.

8
9

And, the second is, your Honor, the
Levangers, in order to maintain this

derivative

10

action, have to have some support by the other members

11

of the association.

12

plaintiffs in this action.

13

And they are the only named

They have absolutely no support.

Even the

14

affidavit they have submitted

15

does not state that they're supportive of this

16

litigation.

17

they're not supportive of this

18

from two other members

They sympathize with the Levangers, but
litigation.

Your Honor, I cited in my brief a case I

19

believe out of Tennessee, the Tennessee Walking1 Horse

20

case, which I believe is a great example of why it's

21

important that the non-profit corporation

22

court not require that the judgment of two

23

members be imposed upon and substituted

24

judgment of a duly appointed board of directors who

25

are lay people, your Honor; they're not

Argument:

-- that the
disgruntled

for the

compensated

Ringwood
15

1098

1

for what they do.

2

They do the best job that they can.

They

3

sought legal advise through every step of the way.

4

And technically we admit, your Honor, that the bylaws

5

do not provide for vote by mail-in ballot.

6

But they also don't specifically

prohibit

7

that approach either, your Honor.

This was a judgment

8

call, and we believe the best-judgment

9

the members of the board, and that the judgment of the

rule protects

10

Levangers or even the judgment of this court

11

not substitute the judgment of the duly-elected

12

as well as the judgment of the majority of members who

13

voted in favor of the amended CC&R's.

14

should
board,

And so we believe that this case should be

15

dismissed, because the Levangers don't fairly and

16

adequately represent the interests of the other

17

members; and that the members of the board of

trustees

18

used reasonable judgment in the approach that

they

19

took in getting the amended CC&R's.

20

And, quite frankly, your Honor, the best

21

resolution of this case is exactly what's

22

now.

23

are only three members on that board out of nine who

24

are named defendants

25

happening

Two months ago, a new board was elected.

There

in this case.

And in fact Becky Levanger herself is now a

Argument:

Ringwood
16
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1

member of the board.

That is how changes should be

2

made, by getting involved, by having the voice heard.
And that's what this case simply is; it's

3
4

just failure to act on their part.

5

coming back after the fact, accusing the board of

6

gross mismanagement, when there's absolutely no

7

evidence of any gross mismanagement.
There's no allegations that

8
9

And now

self-dealing.

they're

they're

There's no allegations of mismanagement

10

of funds; simply the approval and recording of the

11

amended CC&R's.
THE COURT:

12

What can you tell me about the

13

state of the record with respect to the

14

of the Welling letter and draft CC&R's to the members?

15

MR. RINGWOOD:

distribution

The state which the record --

16

in Joanne Vincent's deposition, who was president of

17

the board at the time, she testified that all of

18

the -- that the Welling letter and the voting draft,

19

and the ballot, were hand-delivered by board members

20

to all of the members of the association.

21
22
23

THE COURT:

The Levangers say they didn't get

one .
MR. RINGWOOD:

They testified in their

24

deposition that they received, by hand delivery, the

25

letter by Welling, the voting draft, and the -- and

Argument:

Ringwood
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1

the ballot.

2
3

That's undisputed, your Honor.

THE COURT:

If memory serves, I thought I

read somewhere in these papers that they d i d n f t .

4

MR. RINGWOOD:

N o , I can find the

5

for you.

6

Mr. Sheen will, I f m

7

not a factor in dispute.

8

simply chose not to act on it.

9
10
11

I think we attached

testimony

it as an exhibit.

But

sure, certainly admit that that is
They did receive; they

THE COURT:

Thank you, Mr. Ringwood.

MR. SHEEN:

Thank you, your Honor.

just

Mr.

Sheen?
It's

12

defendants 1 burden of proof to show that present

13

plaintiffs are inadequately

14

derivative action.

15

from the case, which I have a copy of for the court

16

and opposing counsel.

17

representing

in the

I want to read briefly an excerpt

As you are no doubt aware, your Honor, the

18

majority of derivative actions in common law come

from

19

Delaware, where the majority of these cases are tried.

20

This is a case out of the Chancery Court of Delaware;

21

Emerald Partners v. Berlin. It's very short.

22

A defendant has the burden of proof in a

23

motion to disqualify a derivative

24

and he must show that a serious

25

exists, by virtue of one factor or a

plaintiff

conflict

18

1 101

1

combination of factors, and that the

2

plaintiff cannot be expected

3

interests of the others because doing so

4

would harm his other interests..,

5

In effect, the defendant must show a

6

substantial likelihood

7

action is not being maintained

8

benefit of the shareholders.

9

to act in the

that the derivative
for the

Now, what we hear from the defendants is that there are

10

two sources of antagonism vis-a-vis

11

and the defendants.

12

plaintiffs' failure to pay their assessments over the

13

years.

14

these

plaintiffs

The first source is these

As Mr. Swedish testified

in his deposition,

15

40 or 50 other members of the association remain

16

in the state that the Levangers were in two years ago.

17

Other members have paid their

today

assessments

18

under protest.

19

Ramsdale who has paid her assessment under protest

20.

similar to the Levangers.

21

We filed the affidavits of Shelby

The Levangers are now current in their

22

payment of the assessment.

23

and had the lien removed.

24

hand-delivered

25

their current dues.

They paid the lien amount,
And they have

to the president of the association now
And so they are current, paid

Argument:

Sheen
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1

under protest.

2

In fact they represent

the members

very

3

adequately in terms of assessments, because

4

members assessed, all members are charged a fee, and

5

all members certainly would like to have those

fees

6

adopted legally, assessed

-- any

7

penalties imposed legally and

8
9

all

legally, and imposed

nondiscriminatorily.

We have a case here of the tail wagging
dog, your Honor.

What we have is the defendant

10

my clients are vindictive, and vindictiveness

11

by how they reacted to the filing of the lien.

12

the

saying

is shown

Well, how they reacted to filing of the lien

13

was to request, by way of letter, what the amounts

14

related to, seeking the assistance of legal counsel,

15

and paying the lien.

16

That's how they reacted.

There was no other

17

vindictive or antagonistic behavior on behalf of my

18

client.

19

record that we have for this motion, Exhibits L and M

20

of Defendants 1 memoranda are two letters from the

21

Levangers

In fact, if you look at the state of the

22

I ask that the court will review those if

23

there's any question in your mind about my clients 1

24

antagonism.

25

The sentences begin with, "please provide

Those are professionally-written

Argument:
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1

information."

2

are not -- you know, there's not overblown

3

It's not like they're out to get anybody here.

4

The demands are m a d e , but the demands
language.

And it really is a case of the tail wagging

5

the dog.

6

the fashion they reacted in, which is absolutely

7

reasonable for them to react in that fashion.

8
9
10

They imposed the lien, my clients reacted in

Now, they're saying that's evidence of
vindictiveness.

The filing of the lawsuit is really

the only evidence they have of vindictiveness.

11

And, as the state of the record indicates,

12

my clients attempted

13

otherwise prior to the filing of the lawsuit.

14

for months to obtain

It's interesting

relief

to note that on the bridle

15

path liability omission issue, that was

16

highlighted

17

plaintiffs prior to the filing of the lawsuit.

18

specifically

in a letter from counsel for the

This error has been m a d e , and it was not

19

corrected until a week before the deposition of M s .

20

Vincent.

21

filing of the lawsuit, but noticing up of the

22

deposition of M s . Vincent before the correction was

23

made.

24
25

So apparently

it required not only the

And even at that time, the only way we
discovered

that the correction had been made to the
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1

CC&R's was during the deposition of M s . Vincent, where

2

she first indicated it.

3

So, no communication with Levangers or with

4

anyone else in the association that indeed a mistake

5

had been made.

6

Levangers; the mistake was corrected; but only

7

the Levangers were forced to file the lawsuit.

8
9

The mistake was highlighted by
after

They claim again that's basically a
non-issue.

In fact, the affidavit of Mr. Welling

10

that the liability issue was one thing that

11

agreed on; the one thing that should be included

12

the CC&R's.

13

is

everybody
in

Why did it require the filing of this

14

lawsuit to get that change made?

It's not

15

vindictiveness of my clients.

16

of the board of trustees of this association who

17

believe they're above the statute, the charter

18

documents, and that they can pick and choose which

19

rules they're going to apply at any given point in

20

time.

It's the

entrenchment

21

The second thing, as indicated

22

Mr. Blackborn's affidavit, contrary to antagonism

23

coming from the plaintiffs, it's the board of

24

who treat the members with disdain.

25

affidavit w a s :

Argument:
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1

I probably won't go back after the way I

2

was treated at the October, 1997 meeting.

3

I asked questions that were put off and

4

never answered and told to quit

5

again when I asked a simple question.

6

complaining

Second paragraph:

7

The association was told at one meeting

8

board will make all the

9

regardless of what the members want.

the

decisions

10

That's Blackborn's affidavit.

11

of vindictiveness here.

12

do everything short of filing the lawsuit.

13

the filing of the lawsuit, attempts have been made to

14

try and open up the lines of

15

So, there's no evidence

My clients have attempted to
Even after

communication.

Certainly, M s . Levanger's present

position

16

on the board of trustees suggests that there's

some

17

support

18

association, as I indicated

19

highlight the point that we represent very few if any

20

members of the association.

21

Emerald Partners, because it's instructive in this

22

case.

for the Levangers within the home owners
in my brief.

But they do

And I read again

from

Another very short segment:

23

A stockholder derivative claim may be

24

maintained although it does not have the

25

support of a majority of the

Argument:
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1

shareholders or even the support of all the

2

minority

3

The true measure of adequacy of

4

representation, therefore, is not how many

5

shareholders

6

represents, but rather, how well he

7

advances the interests of the other

8

similarly

9

Well, these clients are committed

shareholders,..

the derivative

situated

plaintiff

shareholders.
to pursuing

the

10

action which is the first and foremost evidence of the

11

adequacy of representation.

12

so, employed competent counsel, and counsel is pursuing

13

the matter vigorously, and they intend to pursue it to

14

its conclusion,

15
16
17

They have, if I may say

THE COURT:

Who are other similarly

situated

MR. SHEEN:

W e l l , you have -- I take that on

members ?

18

two different levels, your Honor.

19

wants to see that the home owners association

20

lawfully, legally.

21

One, every member
operates

They're entitled to that.

They have a contract with the association.

22

Both the CC&R's, the b y l a w s , and articles of

23

incorporation are contracts among these individuals.

24

They want to see those contracts are

25

appropriately

enforced

and legally and the statutes of the

Argument; Sheen
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1

state of Utah are enforced.

2

it's every member.

3

So that on that level,

The members who are particularly upset,

4

however, are represented

5

and M s . Shelby; the affidavits

6

connection with this, with our opposition to the

7

motion.

8
9
10

for example by Mr. Blackborn
that were filed in

They have been willing

to come forward and

state their opposition to the current state of
affairs.

11

Even though Mr. Blackborn indicates when you

12

do state your opposition, you are then treated as

13

though you are the enemy.

14

accepted in this association.

15

And opposing views are not

And Blackborn's affidavit makes that clear.

16

So our contention is that there are a vast number of

17

members of the association who --

18

THE COURT:

Defined by -- give me a

19

definition, of the secondary, the subsidiary group of

20

similarly situated m e m b e r s .

21

characteristics do they have?

22

MR. SHEEN:

What

shared

Those members who disagree with

23

the method by which the association adopted

24

CC&R•s.

25

THE COURT:

That's group N o . 1.

Argument:
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1

telling me is that Group N o . 1 is comprised of all of

2

the members, because all of the members have a stake

3

in having lawfully adopted articles, CC&R's and

4

bylaws.

5

Okay.

6

you say exists.

That includes Mr. Blackborn and your

7

other affiants.

What I'm

8

the characteristics

9

Levangers?

10

Now, there's a subsidiary group

looking for is:

that they share with

What

that

are

the

Other than not liking the board, which is

what you have told me so far.

11

MR. SHEEN:

When you say, "not liking

the

12

board," your Honor, it's -- you know, I hesitate to

13

put it in those terms, because it is not a question --

14

it's a question of not allowing open discussion of

15

these issues.

16

For example, one of the issues at trial,

17

your Honor, is going to b e , here you have CC&R's

18

are adopted over a more than 12-month

19

balloting process, in which only the proponents of the

20

CC&R's have all of the weight and authority and power

21

and speaking ability because you're not holding a

22

meeting.

23

remember the CC&R's, there's a cutoff period

24

balloting which is arbitrarily

25

of trustees .

-- say

You're changing rules midstream.

Argument:

that

14-month

You
for

extended by the board

Sheen
26

1 1 09

1

You have the written communications

which

2

are prepared by the proponents and then sent out.

3

They highlight

4

clear.

5

whereas you have no opportunity

6

to render opposing views.

7

the issues proponents want to make

Then you have solicitation of those votes,
in a meeting

setting

And, if you do render opposing views -- and

8

Mr. Blackborn indicates, and as the Levangers have

9

found, it's not that you are -- that you then hate the

10

board of trustees.

11

you're raising issues they just don't want to deal

12

with, or that are not within the agenda they want to

13

pursue.

14

It's that they hate you because

So these parties

-- maybe the clearest way

15

to represent that portion is, you know,

16

this case now we've had it highlighted over and over

17

again, that there's simply an insufficient number of

18

members of the association who are interested

19

to attend meetings.

20

throughout

enough

Well, that's not the take that the Levangers

21

and Blackborns and the Ramsdales and others have on

22

this situation.

23

They found their voices to be ineffective,

24

or they desired to maintain the status quo.

25

not attending the meeting, they know that no action

Argument:
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1

can be taken.

2

have a quorum there and they have actively voted by

3

not attending.

4

taking in the matter.

5

Actions cannot be taken.

They will not

And that's the position that we're

And if that's the sub-category

6

looking

7

sub-category other than people who are willing

8

voice openly their opinion of the operation of the

9

association.

10

for, I'm

you're

frankly trying to come up with a

THE COURT:

to

W e l l , then how would your

11

sub-category deal with the reconvened meeting?

12

would show up en masse to the reconvened meeting?

13

don't buy it.

14

MR. SHEEN:

The notion of a reconvened

meeting cannot emasculate the more specific

16

of the bylaws, statutes and the CC&R's.
THE COURT:

provisions

It seems to me it's unambiguous.

18

The bylaws say, if you don't get a quorum at the

19

annual meeting, and if you notice the

20

meeting, if you have one person there, that person

21

sets the pot.

22

I

I mean, is that what you're telling me?

15

17

They

reconvened

That's absolutely clear as I read that.

MR. SHEEN:

Y e s , on matters which are not

23

otherwise specifically dealt with, the bylaws, the

24

CC&R's are contracts and they're interpreted

25

to contract provisions.

according

Argument: Sheen
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1

If you have a specific contract provision,

2

it controls over the general, and there are

3

provisions

4

specific

that describe how CC&R's are adopted.
And it says a majority of the home owners

5

must approve the amendments

to the CC&R's and bylaws,

6

and in similar fashion with a majority of the members

7

at a meeting.

8

way you can amend the bylaws.

It says, in fact, those are the only

9

They attempted, through amending the CC&R's,

10

to not only amend the CC&R's by a process that was not

11

allowed, but to amend the bylaws by saying that the

12

bylaws could then be adopted by the board of

13

through the CC&R's.

14

trustees

And that's why this group, the sub - category,

15

is probably best characterized

16

saying, "we can't win because you get to pick and

17

choose your rules as you go."

18

as those people who are

Well, the contract interpretation

says that

19

the specific controls over the general, so when you

20

have a general provision, but then you have a

21

paragraph that deals with a very specific issue, that

22

specific issue controls.

23

And our contention is that the

24

meeting

25

just prior to the lawsuit being filed

reconvened

-- which, by the way, never occurred

Argument:
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1

evidence of any reconvened meeting at any time in

2

history.

3

that policy.

So the board of trustees had never
That's the

adopted

situation.

4

THE COURT:

Okay.

Thank you.

5

MR. SHEEN:

Thank you, your Honor.

6

THE COURT:

Tell me the defendants 1

7

perspective on this contention that there are

8

provisions in the CC&R's, and I guess the bylaws,

9

bearing on the question of amendments, and that

10

specific provisions trump the reconvened

11

procedural

12

specific

those

meeting

scheme.

MR. RINGWOOD:

I don't agree with that, your

13

Honor, because in looking at the 1972 CC&R's, it says

14

that - -

15

THE COURT:

Where are you

16

MR. RINGWOOD:

I'm

17

the signature page, Page 4.

18

memoranda, your Honor.

19

THE COURT:

20

MR. RINGWOOD:

looking?

looking on the last page,
It's Exhibit A to our

All right.

Page 4, Exhibit A.

Right after

-- the first

21

paragraph, after where it says "lot split," there's a

22

paragraph which is unlettered

there.

It says:

23

These conditions

24

and shall be binding upon all parties and

25

all persons claiming under them until March

Rebuttal;
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1

10, 1982, at which time said

2

shall be automatically

3

THE COURT:

4

MR. RINGWOOD:

conditions

extended.

Yes.
Notice, your Honor, it does

5

not say that it needs to be a majority at a meeting.

6

It just simply says, "unless by vote of majority of

7

the owners in the subdivision," and I don't see that

8

that's any more specific, your Honor, than the bylaws.

9

The thing about the bylaws is they are more

10

specific than covenants, and if you want to take this

11

as being the specific way, then there'd be no

12

violation in the amending of the voting procedure,

13

because it's not restricting how that vote should

14

place.

15

take

Again, your Honor, it comes back to I

16

believe this was a business judgment call, made by the

17

members of the board, with the advice of counsel.

18

And --

19

THE COURT:

What about Mr. Sheen's

argument

20

that lack of attendance at the meeting was an

21

affirmative manifestation of the non-attending

22

owners' desires to maintain the status quo and to

23

block all action at the meetings?

24
25

MR. RINGWOOD:

home

The only evidence in the

record, your Honor, is the testimony of Joanne Vigil

Rebuttal;
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1

in her deposition, who stated from Day One they had

2

absolutely no

3

involvement.

It's a continual problem:

They just can't

4

get the members to come to the m e e t i n g s .

5

have anything to do with any protest.

6

absolutely no evidence in the record that this was

7

because of any protest.

8
9

It doesn't

There's

It's simply absence, your Honor.
frustrating

thing for the board m e m b e r s .

And it's a
Joanne

said

10

in her deposition, because they couldn't get -- as

11

hard as they tried, they tried refreshments, they

12

tried everything

13

back twenty years.

14

didn't start with the $37 a year annual

to get people involved; and this goes
It's not a recent phenomenon.
assessment.

15

It's taken place from Day One.

16

matter of getting people interested enough to come

17

out.

18

It

It's just a

You know, this sounds a lot like a family

19

fight, your Honor.

20

Ever time there's a disagreement

21

procedure being run, we're going to be back in here.

22

Are you going to have to monitor this family feud into

23

the future?

24
25

And where is this going to stop?
in a way of a

That's not what Rule 23.1 is all about.

THE COURT:

Yeah, but isn't it possible to

have one member lead an entirely appropriate

.Rebuttal ;

crusade
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1

to right the wrongs of management of a non-profit

2

corporation?

3

contemplation?

4

Or isn't that within the realm of

MR. RINGWOOD:

It may be in the realm of

5

contemplation, your Honor, but I don't believe

6

Rule 23,1 to a derivative action's necessarily the way

7

that should be done.

8
9

THE COURT:

that

W e l l , let me come at this from a

different direction.

It would be unusual, would it

10

not, for a majority block of shareholders and members

11

in a corporation, to initiate derivative

12

shareholders derivative

13

MR. RINGWOOD:

14

THE COURT:

-- a

action?
Y e s , it would b e .

And so almost by definition,

15

shareholder derivative actions are initiated by a

16

minority of shareholders.

17

W e l l , how is the law to determine whether

18

minority is raising a legitimate issue and

19

gaining standing under the Rule

20

Then the question is:
that
thereby

23.1?

That's - - as near as I can tell, that's what

21

led them to jurisprudence

22

papers; seven, eight factors that gives them guidance.

23

that you cite in your

As I did my own personal ranking of those

24

factors, it struck me that vindictiveness was the most

25

elusive or one of the more elusive of those, because
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1

it calls upon a judge to apply the name-calling

2

in kind of determining whether there's

3

name-calling going on here to go into the red zone.

enough

4

And I've got to tell you, I'm

5

with making a ruling on standing on a derivative

6

action where the primary

7

contention.

8

on that.

9
10

meter

thrust is the

uncomfortable

vindictiveness

I mean that's kind of where I'm hung up

MR. BELNAP:
THE COURT:

Judge, can I have just a moment?
Sure.

11

(Whereupon, a discussion was had off the

12

record between counsel; after which, the

13

following proceedings continued

14

court:)

15

MR. RINGWOOD:

in open

Your Honor, in dealing with

16

that, these -- one of the contentions

17

making, the undisputed

18

had ample opportunity

19

taking place, and they chose not to.

that we're

facts are that the Levangers
to voice concern about what was

20

And in fact the covenants were recorded, and

21

several months went by, and it was discussed in all of

22

the meetings that the Levangers refused to attend.

23

It wasn't until a demand was made, and this

24

is a case in which -- you know, I agree

25

plaintiffs' vindictiveness

.Rebuttal ;
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is one of the more

elusive
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1

ones.

But this is one case where it's appropriate,

2

because of the facts and circumstances of this case.

3

And again, your Honor, we're

also

4

maintaining

5

amongst the other members of the association.

6

that there's no support for this

lawsuit

For years, you couldn't even bring a

7

derivative action in a non-profit corporation, and

8

it's for this very reason.

9

And now the courts have softened that rule

10

and allowed derivative actions, because there are

11

circumstances, your Honor, where a board member

12

himself is dealing with the corporation.

13

economic hardship to the corporation.

14

And it's an

But again, I believe that the Tennessee

15

Walking Horse case is right on point with this case,

16

and simply asking this court through a derivative

17

action to substitute its judgment

18

judgment of the board m e m b e r s .

19

for the

reasonable

There's no evidence before the court

that

20

they did anything inappropriate

21

were voted upon.

22

prohibited

23

They chose to do it that way out of caution because

24

they wanted everybody

25

in the way that CC&R's

There's nothing pointed to that it

the manner in which they chose to do it.

to have an opportunity.

I believe that, pursuant to the bylaws, they

EeJbuttal :
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1

could have held a reconvened meeting and passed

2

CC&R's.

3

THE COURT:

4

MR. RINGWOOD:

those

All right.
And that Rule 2 3 . 1 , as we

5

cited it, derivative actions are not favored in the

6

law.

7

is the primary reason why.

They should be used as a last resort, and

8
9

this

It's because we're standing here with a lot
to do about nothing, and the manner in which this case

10

should be fixed and handled, if there's a problem, is

11

exactly the way it's being done now; with a new board,

12

of which Becky Levanger is a member.

13

And if there are some problems with the

14

amended CC&R's, then it's their prerogative

15

them again.

16

to amend

And that's the proper way to resolve

these

17

types of disputes, not here before your Honor in a

18

case in which virtually a corporation has sued

19

with absolutely no benefit to be derived

20
21

THE COURT:

Thank you.

itself

from it.

I have a few

questions for Mr. Sheen.

22

MR. BELNAP:

Your Honor, also, if you were

23

still interested, Judge, in those

deposition

24

citations, it doesn't appear it's in dispute, but we

25

have

them.

.Rebuttal :

Ringwood
36

1119

1
2

THE COURT:

That's with respect to the

acquisition of the Welling letter and --

3

MR. BELNAP:

4

MR. SHEEN:

And other materials.
Right.

I also have a copy of

5

this Emerald Partners case I quoted from, if you would

6

like to have it.

7
8

THE COURT:

If you could pass that up, let's

take a look at it.

9

MR. SHEEN:

I'm

11

THE COURT:

Okay.

12

MR. SHEEN:

My client makes an important

10

sorry, your Honor; just one

second.

13

point, your Honor.

14

who received notice of the proposed changes to the

15

CC&R's.

16
17
18

There's still a contention

about

And it relates to -THE COURT:

It's hard to put that on the

record at this point.
MR. SHEEN:

W e l l , it relates to the fact that

19

the association does not maintain a list of members

20

per se, but only ad hoc, as needed.

21

And it flows back to the notion that, in the

22

beginning, it was anticipated

23

have a membership certificate, which the argument has

24

been made that that provision has been taken out.

25

that every member would

But the importance of that is there are many

ColloquySi
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1
2
3
4
5
6

non-resident members of the association.
THE COURT:

How does the association know who

to send notice of the meetings
MR. SHEEN:

I believe on an ad hoc basis;

they take it as best they can from the real property.
THE COURT:

But that issue has never been

7

raised in the papers.

8

that suggests that's a problem.

9

to?

MR. SHEEN:

There's nothing in the record
So --

Well, in connection with

their

10

motion for summary judgment, you're right, but in

11

connection with the trial on the m e r i t s , that's

12

absolutely an issue.

13

complaint.

14

I mean it's at issue in the

We made it clear, that lack of a --

THE COURT:

W e l l , part of this motion goes to

15

the merits.

16

as I understand

17

of the plaintiffs to bring a derivative action.

18

second part is as to the merits of the case itself.

19

As I -- this motion is a two-part motion,
it.

MR. SHEEN:

One is challenge

to the

standing
The

W e l l , but they haven't asked

20

the entire case be dismissed on the m e r i t s .

21

raised several of the -- what they consider to be

22

substantive claims, but they've said nothing about

23

member lists.

24

motion for summary

25

All I'm doing is responding

THE COURT:

that

They have

the

to their

judgment.
W e l l , I understand, but it seems
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1

to me the member list issue may have some bearing on

2

the merits of one of these claims, and -- well, I

3

guess if it does, it does.

4

Let me turn to the question that's on my mind.

If it doesn't, it doesn't.

5

MR. SHEEN:

Okay.

6

THE COURT:

Which is:

You have indicated to

7

me that the event of a meeting is kind of the sine qua

8

non of proper action to be taken for and on behalf of

9

the home owners

10

association.

And if I'm correct, and that's what you have

11

been trying to communicate

to m e , I would like to have

12

you tell me why, in your mind, the meeting is so

13

important that I should strictly apply the meeting

14

requirements of the bylaws.

15

MR. SHEEN:

W e l l , because there are several

16

concepts here, your Honor.

17

voting and the requirement of voting, and another goes

18

to the manner of voting.

19

2.5., the only manner of voting allowed under

20

contract with the home owners is all votes may be cast

21

by m e m b e r s , either in person or by proxy.

22

indication in any of the --

23
24
.25

THE COURT:

One is the concept of

And the bylaws, Section

There's no

Okay, but that begs the question.

Please understand my question.
I'll

this

My question is, okay,

spot you that that's what that says.

I think
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1

it's unambiguous.

2

That's what it says.

But, why is the meeting

so important that I

3

should strictly construe that section as opposed

4

permitting substantial compliance with it through an

5

alternate decision-making process; to-wit, voting

6

outside the context of the meeting?

7

MR. SHEEN:

I'll

to

tell you what the record

8

indicates so far, your Honor.

The record indicates at

9

members' meetings, poorly attended

though they b e , at

10

which the members voiced opposition to matters, those

11

matters were tabled, were not acted on, and the board

12

of trustees heard and acted on dissenting members'

13

viewpoints in the meetings.

14

testimony of Mary

15

Stevens w a s , that there were multiple attempts over a

16

period of years to adopt amended CC&R's.

17

meeting of the members, there was not a consensus on

18

how best to do that.

19

And the

deposition

-- Kathy Mears w a s , and Roger

And at every

And so our contention is that, had a meeting

20

been held, there would have been that opposition to

21

the association, and it's that give and take that is

22

required.

23

That's the reason the statutes are written

24

the way they are.

25

have been

That's the reason methods of voting

adopted.
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1

THE COURT:

How do you factor in proxies

2

this?

3

a lot more persuasiveness

4

provide for proxies.

5

common law, proxies weren't

into

I mean, all this would I think be -- would have

6

to me if the law didn't

As you probably know, under the
permitted.

And of course since proxies have been

7

recognized, it's quite possible to have a meeting at

8

which there are very few attendees; but

9

nevertheless a quorum.

10

But those people who

submit

proxies, they're not there to give their views.

11
12

there's

MR. SHEEN:

N o , but they have an agent there.

That's a representative

13

THE COURT:

democracy.

But it's delegated.

They have

14

delegated

15

agents.

16

They don't get any benefit of the give and take of a

17

meeting because they have given it away.

18

their right to hear competing views to their
So, as a practical matter, they're not there.

They have given it to their agent who holds

19

the proxy, who attends the meeting, who voices

20

proxy.

21

MR. SHEEN:

I'm afraid I don't

the

understand

22

what the court is struggling with here.

Because when

23

you give someone a proxy, you have determined

24

that person can represent your interests at the

25

meeting.

That is still a personal, physical

that

presence
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1

at the meeting, because that person has had to

2

consciously decide that this person is going to

3

represent

him.

4

THE COURT:

Well here's --

5

MR. SHEEN:

Whether he's an assenter or

6
7

proponent.
"•

THE COURT:

It may be a small matter.

8

try to articulate it more clearly.

9

your papers suggests that meetings are a good

10

Let me

The case cited in
idea

because there's discussion at the meetings.

11

There's an idealistic view that many of us

12

hold that one can benefit

13

that usually happens in a meeting.

14

have attended many meetings over our lifetime, we

15

disagree with that.

16

from an exchange of views
Those of us who

(Laughter)

But there's an impression, in the abstract,

17

that there's something

18

give and take.

19

to be gained somehow with the

What -- and sometimes that give and take

20

modifies the hardened view that individuals may have

21

when they walk in the door at the meeting.

22

In other w o r d s , the power of persuasion

23

sometimes has an effect on those sought to be

24

persuaded.

25

The concept of proxy distorts that

salutary

Colloquy
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benefit of a meeting to the extent that those who
entrust

-- by proxy

-- their power to vote to another,

don't benefit from the persuasive interchange

from the

dialogue, so to speak, that may go on in a meeting.
They delegate everything
holds the proxy, including

to the person who

the possibility

might themselves be persuaded

that they

in a manner contrary to

the way that the person who holds the proxy is voting.
Is that any

clearer?

MR. SHEEN:

Y e s , that's clearer.

could argue with the court for one brief

And if I
instance,

then agree with the court.
THE COURT:

Please do so.

MR. SHEEN:

The proxy process is - - let me

agree with the court.
THE COURT:

Please.

It happens so seldom.

(Laughter)
MR. SHEEN:

The point I was going to make is,

in most meetings I have attended
attended a few over the years

-- and you've

-- where there's a large

gathering, there tends to be dominant personalities,
and those dominant personalities

tend to control

the

outcome of the meeting one way or the other.
And in that sense I would hope that proxies
are given on the basis of the person's involvement

Colloquy

and

1

they're saying, "I ! m not one of those people.

2

attend, the people

3

personality; I know a friend who i s , " or, "this is the

4

position I would want to take, so I would entrust

5

into the hands of my

6

If I

-- I will not be a dominant

that

representative."

But let me agree with the court, that

7

proxies are a distortion of that meeting

8

but only a slight distortion, in my view, your Honor.

9

environment;

What is much more a distortion of the
Ifm

10

meeting concept is the concept of balloting.

11

talking about balloting over a long period of time.

12

And I'm

talking about balloting over a

13

period of time, during which changes in membership may

14

occur, and balloting

15

the board of trustees, without

16

without further notice other than an after-the-fact,

17

basically a newsletter

18

actually is received by the home owners or not -- that

19

says,

20

the drop-dead date of X is on, has now been

21

because we didn't get the result we wanted."

22

still goes on; and during which
further notice, now --

that gets delivered; whether it

"by the way, the balloting, for which we said

That's the process we're dealing with here,

23

your Honor.

24

this case, here's the situation we have.

25

extended,

And if I can take it down to the facts of

We have meetings over the past year
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and-a-half, including

the 1997 meeting referred to in

the affidavit and during the depositions, the various
meetings discussed, where opposition to various
matters was raised by the home owners.
The actions were not taken, matters were
tabled.

You have that throughout

home owners

the history of the

association.

Now juxtapose that conduct with the conduct
of the board of trustees when they say, "instead of
doing a reconvene meeting

,!

- - which, by the way,

there 1 s no evidence that that discussion ever

occurred

during the early days of the adoption of 1994, or the
•94 process of balloting
lost my train of thought.
angles.

-- but in any event -- now I
I go off on those side

Where was I?
THE COURT:

W e l l , what you were telling me

was that the record doesn't suggest that they even
tried to reconvene a meeting and that there were
inherent defects with the voting process.
And you pointed out to me that, according to
you, the problems with the voting process

included

inadequate management over the members who were
eligible to vote; to-wit, some might have died and
moved, transferred

their interest, become non-members,

new members show up, different

things.
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1

That the time for voting was

extended,

2

apparently without any legitimate basis to do so.

3

I guess if the voting process was illegitimate

4

first place, the extension would be that it would be

5

now.

6

are the advocates

7

press so to speak.

And that the proponents of the voting

8
9

in the

process

in changes, and they controlled

MR. SHEEN:

And

the

Those seem to be the major points.
The last point I wanted to wrap

this up with was that, in -- there will be a strong

10

inference

from the evidence that we have so far that

11

actions of the board of trustees were to

12

avoid that meeting because they hadn't been able to

13

accomplish it previously

14

meetings.

intentionally

in the context of those

15

Too much open opposition.

16

an element of intent here that we think we're

17

to put on, and have the court's --

18
19
20

THE COURT:

So there's

almost

entitled

Where's the record on that

that's

before me now?
MR. SHEEN:

W e l l , you see I think we've

21

expanded it -- w e l l , I thought the absolute

primary

22

thrust of their memoranda was the

23

representation of the claim.

24

needs to be augmentation of the record on that point,

25

and if the court will allow m e , I'm happy to do that,

inadequate

And so now if there
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1

as well as the lack of members list.

2

in depositions about each of those points.

3

THE COURT:

Okay.

There's

All right.

I'm

evidence

prepared

4

to rule.

5

Levangers on the derivative action, my

6

is that based on the reports that I have seen, there

7

are insufficient

8

a matter of law, determine

9

inappropriate parties to bring an action.

10

First, with respect to the standing of the
determination

facts and insufficient grounds to, as
that the Levangers

are

Turning to the merits of the claim, it's my

11

determination

12

taken by the trustees that led to the adoption of the

13

amended CC&R's were proper.

14

that, as a matter of law, the actions

And I'm going to tell you why.

15

that there is nothing

16

fundamental

17

this process by which those entities amend

18

charters or their beginning documents so to speak.

19

-- few things

It is true

-- more

to corporations, entities in general, than
their

In this case, and I think in all cases, the

20

primary objective of the decision-making procedures

21

effect changes and amendments

22

was to encourage participation by system members, and

23

to invite and solicit the v o t e s , so to speak, of those

24

members with respect to the issues.

25

to the organic

The bylaws are unanimous

Court's

to

documents

insofar as they set
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1

out a procedure

2

contemplate amendments

3

meeting, and -- in the absence of a quorum

4

reconvened meeting, at which no quorum would be

5

necessary.

6

for amendment.

Those

procedures

to be adopted at an annual
-- at a

That procedure is, in my view, directly at

7

odds with the fundamental objective of seeking a

8

maximization of participation

9

concern in important matters like amending the bylaws,

10

in the

decision-making

amending the CC&I^s.

11

Next:

The CC&R's, as they existed in '96,

12

do not expressly require that changed amendment to be

13

adopted in the context of a meeting.

14

The question then is:

Did the

alternate

15

voting proceeding comply with the terms of the bylaws

16

and CC&R f s?

17

To answer this question, one has to address

18

this:

19

other words, did it comply?

20

analytical method one which would yield a result

21

one has to strictly comply with those

22
23
24
25

Does the determination of that question -- in
-- is the proper
that

provisions?

Or is substantial compliance enough to
comply with those

provisions?

And resolving that, I look to the way

that

the law looks at whether the provisions of a statute

Court's
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1

should be strictly complied with, or whether

2

provision of a statute may be substantially

3

with and thereby meet the requirements of the statute.

4

the
complied

Because it seemed to me that substantive --

5

the substantial versus strict compliance

6

situation with respect to statutes fits, at least

7

roughly, this kind of contract

8
9

analysis

setting.

That analysis requires investigation of
whether the substitute performance
-- was prejudicial

-- in this case

10

voting

11

interests were supposed to be protected by the

12

unambiguous bylaws.

13

to the people whose

And it's my conclusion that, as a matter of

14

law, those protections were present and no prejudice

15

occurred.

I base that on the following

16

factors.

First, insofar as the record is concerned,

17

that I have before m e , the Welling

18

draft CC&R's went to everybody who should have got

19

them.

That's what the reports that I have tell m e .

20

Well, is there any collateral support

21

this?

22

came in.

23

the votes.

24
25

letter and the

I believe there is.

for

The majority of yes votes

Somebody must have known about it.

They got

There has been no genuine issue of fact
presented which I can find that

Court's

legitimately
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1

challenges

2

the alternate process.
In other w o r d s , did the voting process

have

3

integrity?

4

supports the conclusion that it did have integrity; in

5

other words, nobody suggested

6

counted.

7

actually vote for it.

8
9

It's my conclusion that the record

Nobody suggested

that votes weren't

that a majority

didn't

The sanctity of meetings is not the be-all
and end-all of a legitimate decision-making

process

10

concerning corporate governance or amendments

11

organic corporate documents.

12

Under Utah's corporation

to

law for example,

13

there is express authorization

14

outside the context of a meeting; albeit there is a

15

requirement

16

to make

decisions

that notice be provided.

And I would suggest that here, that there is

17

certainly, impliedly, notice that there was going to

18

be a decision, an important decision made outside

19

context of the meeting.

20

the

Furthermore, whereas here meetings could be

21

conducted by attendance through proxy, the

22

that meetings are necessary to encourage the vigorous

23

exchange of views is severely undercut.

24
25

argument

If I were to point out, however, the most
salient reason that, in my view, the voting

Court's

process
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1

was an appropriate substitute, it's this:

That based

2

on the state of the record, the reconvened

meeting

3

process was detrimental

objective

4

of encouraging and maximizing participation in the

5

decision-making.

6

to the fundamental

The voting process as adopted by the

7

trustees was clearly directed towards that

8

objective.

9

contention that failing to participate

laudable

I want to just remark briefly on the
in meetings was

10

an affirmative act designed to affirmatively

11

actions of the trustees.

12

block

It's my belief that that contention is a

13

weak one, because of the availability of proxies.

14

First, individuals who are members of an organization

15

should

16

support or opposition to issues by showing up

17

affirmatively doing something about it.

-- I guess as a moral issue -- exercise

18

their

That judgmental, general judgmental point of

19

view is, I believe, brought down to a -- brought to

20

practical

21

don't want to go to a meeting, if you're

22

by who's going to be there, if you're gone and can't

23

be there because you're going to be in the Bahamas,

24

you find somebody you trust and you give them the

25

proxy, and you have that person show up and vote for

fruition through the proxy process.

Court's

If you

intimidated
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1

or in opposition to the issue based on the proxy.

2

So, all of that is a long way of

saying

3

this:

4

that the plaintiffs' case bears on the propriety of

5

the amendment process, I'm

6

law, that it does.

7

That it's my conclusion that, to the extent

finding, as a matter of

And to reiterate:

I'm

at this time denying

8

the motion, for lack of a better term, to disqualify

9

the Levangers as derivative action claimants, or

10

p l a i n t i f f s , which in my view leaves us with the

11

remaining claims of the plaintiffs.

12

I guess that would be the gross

13

mismanagement business; although I'm

14

little bit unclear to m e , because if I've

15

the CC&R amendments are appropriate, that may have

16

implications

17

you have to sort those out; since at some point we're

18

going to have to decide what's going to be tried and

19

what's not going to be

20
21

—

for the gross mismanagement

even that is a
determined

issues, and

tried.

So, I'm going to stop talking and let you
weigh in to that somewhat.

22

MR. BELNAP:

Your Honor, I don't believe

23

there's anything left to try, in view of the court's

24

ruling.

25

THE COURT:

W e l l , you know, I would

Court's

expect
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1

you to say that.

But maybe the best thing to do is to

2

let the dust settle.

3

say

Mr. Sheen, you seem anxious to

something.

4

MR. SHEEN:

I think I want to let the dust

I think I f m

leaning toward requesting

5

settle.

6

this be certified

so that we get --

7

THE COURT:

Yes.

8

MR. SHEEN:

-- so we can take that up.

9
10

that

does emasculate the case.

It

I don't think it gets rid

of it altogether.

11

THE COURT:

Mr. Sheen actually raises a

12

pretty legitimate point.

13

trying this -- some little piece or some big piece

14

that I decide is what's left -- and all of

15

contingent on me being right on what I just did.

16

may end up being back doing the whole business again.

17

You know, I think there's some merit to what Mr. Sheen

18

says.

19

We spend a couple of days

that's

Practically, where does that take us?

We

Your

20

client may want to weigh in.

21

MR. SHEEN:

Is he standing up there behind

23

THE COURT:

Besides strangling m e , of course.

24

MR. LEVANGER:

25

MR. SHEEN:

22

me?

I would just --

No, no.

Court's

Ruling
53

1I3S

1

THE COURT:

Well, I understand.

2

say this for your benefit.

3

infallibility.

4

I've

5

somebody's going to be unhappy.

6

the big bucks by the taxpayers.

Let me

just

I make no claim to

That's why there are appellate courts.

done what I did; somebody's going to be happy,

7

That's why I get paid

Fortunately, you have competent

counsel

8

who's indicated he's probably going to let the

9

appellate court take a look at what I did and we all

10

may be back in this courtroom with me being very

11

chastened and humiliated by a court of appeals

12

says I made a mistake.

13

guess.

14

that

But I can live with that, I

Let's take practically what we're going to

15

do here.

16

this at the present time?

17

to think about whether you want to take it up and file

18

your papers.

19

trial date and see what happens.

20

Do you want to keep the trial date on in
It would give you some time

If you file your p a p e r s , you strike the

MR. SHEEN:

That's certainly agreeable to m e .

21

I would make that decision within the next day or two;

22

say Tuesday.

23

MR. BELNAP:

Your Honor, maybe you don't want

24

to get into this because we're into the

25

stage here, which I understand.

Court's

dust-settling

But if you look at
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1

the complaint and the prayer for relief,

2

A through D, which are all the prayers that are made,

3

A asks injunctive relief with respect to the CC&R's.

4

You have dealt with that.

5

Subparagraphs

B asks for attorneys fees because of the

6

derivative action, and that's dealt with by the ruling

7

on A.

8

C asks for removal of the defendants as

9

officers and trustees and for the election of new

10

trustees because of the alleged conduct in A.

11

that's been dealt with.

12

And

And D says, "as to all causes of action for

13

rescission of all prior ultra vires and unauthorized

14

acts, or in issuance of membership certificates

15

for damages for rectifying prior unauthorized

16

and

acts."

We'll stipulate right now, your Honor, that

17

these people have been offered a membership

18

certificate and we'll stipulate that an order can

19

enter.

20

We'll give them o n e .
THE COURT:

Okay.

Here's what I see as maybe

21

the driving issue.

22

it coming back on the grounds that all of the issues

23

weren't resolved in summary

24
25

MR. SHEEN:

If this is going up, I don't want

judgment.

That's certainly the first

I would raise, your Honor, because I read

Court's

issue

different
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1

parts of the complaint and would indicate that

2

are outstanding

3

there

issues.

THE COURT:

And we're going to have to

4

wrestle with this because it's going to be a critical

5

question on appeal.

6

And if it goes up on appeal from a motion

7

for a partial summary judgment, we're going to have to

8

go through all the certification business and address

9

the prerequisites

10

to certification.

I've got to think you've got to do that

11

anyway; just to cover yourself.

12

fully appreciate where you're coming

13

MR. BELNAP:

And, Mr. Belnap, I
from.

I would just say, your Honor, as

14

a suggestion, if counsel believes that there are

15

issues that have not been disposed off by this court's

16

ruling, we're two weeks away from trial.

17

I think we ought to show up for trial, and

18

within what is framed in this complaint, if he claims

19

there's issues that haven't been disposed of, then we

20

ought to dispose of them.

21

trial.

22

We're two weeks away from

Then the whole thing's going up.
THE COURT:

Okay.

Just a second.

Let me --

23

I'm going to let you have your say on this, but I want

24

to follow up on this.

25

If we do that, if we do that, why

Court's

shouldn't
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1

we try and take an expansive view of the

2

issues left to be tried, rather than a narrow view?

3

available

At least if we do that -- and I'm

still

4

going to let you tell me this whole thing's a bad

5

idea -- there are going to be findings and

6

on the whole rest of the business, and that might be

7

beneficial ultimately, I think.

8
9

MR. SHEEN:

conclusions

I don't know.

I'm only thinking

about

economies, your Honor, and I have admitted that your

10

decision has rendered difficult the guts of this case.

11

I do not agree with Mr. Belnap that now the entire

12

case is gone.

13

But it doesn't seem to make sense unless

14

we're going to do as the court suggests, which I guess

15

I'm open to considering.

16

In other w o r d s , I guess we'll be making a

17

record on appeal in the event that the appellate

18

disagrees with the court's decision on the motion for

19

summary

20

judgment.
It seems kind of an uneconomical way of

21

handling the situation when the central issue I

22

believe will probably need to be decided by an

23

appellate court.

24
25

court

THE COURT:

How are you prejudiced

if there

are remaining issues and we don't try it on the 22nd?

Court's
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1

MR. BELNAP:

I can't think of any, other

than

2

we're ready, Judge; and, you know, we now -- as Mr.

3

Ringwood has indicated, there's a newly-elected

4

in place.

5

These people need to get on with

board

their

6

lives.

7

denied injunctive relief, he said, "you folks need to

8

get on, and you need to, you know, function and get

9

along."

10

Judge Brian directed at the time that he

And so, that would be the only basis.

We

11

realize you cannot sit on the bench and tell people,

12

"go get along," and they always will do it.

13

doesn't happen.

14

conclusion will assist us in doing that.

15

That

But bringing the matter to a

THE COURT:

W e l l , but we still come back to

16

I think kind of a fundamental procedural question, and

17

that is:

18

grant of a motion for partial summary judgment, or is

19

the appeal from a grant of summary judgment

20

resolves all of the issues in the case?

21

Is the appeal going to be an appeal from a

that

I guess it's Mr. Sheen that's probably

22

to have to take the first crack at it.

23

think how we're going to do this.

24

the issues, I guess.

25

MR. BELNAP:

I'm

trying to

Or you can argue

Judge, is it your feeling

Court's

going

that
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1

what we're talking about here -- when you asked me how

2

are we prejudiced, and I indicated I couldn't think of

3

any, other than what I indicated, that it is a cleaner

4

record to go up on partial summary judgment and get

5

that

resolved?

6
7

Which handles what Mr. Sheen calls the guts
of the case anyway, and maybe that's correct.

8
9

It's just when you get this close, and then
in our view this ruling disposes of the case, and

10

there's a difference of opinion on that, I don't know

11

that we're going to be able to convince each other's

12

counsel of that.

13

partial summary

14

So maybe we ought to go up on the
judgment.

THE COURT:

I certainly would

-- I guess I

15

would be sympathetic

16

to getting it up on partial summary judgment, because

17

it certainly makes sense to do it that way.

18

MR. SHEEN:

to making the rulings

appropriate

Could I draft the form of --

19

basically of order and have it approved as to form in

20

that vein?

21

THE COURT:

22

MR. BELNAP:

Yes.
We would like the opportunity,

23

if it's acceptable, to draft findings and

conclusions

24

supporting your partial summary judgment.

If counsel

25

wants to do a 54 B certification, we would like to

Court's Ruling
>
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look at that.
THE COURT:

I think that's a good idea,

because I would like to have the Court of Appeals have
a clear shot at m e ; and, you know, if I made a
mistake, I want them to know -- I want to know
what: it i s .

And so I concur with that.

exactly

Let's go that

way .
MR. SHEEN:

Okay.

THE COURT:

Gentlemen, let's

adjourn, let me thank you both.
well prepared.

-- before you

The papers were very

The case was well argued.

Good

job

all the way around, and this won't be the end of it.
MR. SHEEN:
MR. BELNAP:

Thank you, your Honor.
Thank you, your Honor.

(Whereupon, the instant proceedings came to
a close:)
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Judge William B. Bohling
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;
;
;
;
;
]

Defendant, Highland Estates Properties Owners Association, Inc.'s, Motion for Summary
Judgment came on for hearing before the Honorable Ronald E. Nehring on the 9th day of January,
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1998 at the hour of 10:00 a.m. E. Jay Sheen appeared on behalf of the plaintiffs. Paul M. Belnap and
H. Burt Ringwood appeared on oehalf of the defendant, Highland Estates Properties Owners
Association (hereinafter referred to as "Highland Estates"). The oral argument having taken place
9 days prior to the trial of this matter. The Court having considered the defendant's Memorandum
in Support of its Motion for Summary Judgment, the plaintiffs' Memorandum in Opposition to
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment and Defendant's Reply to Plaintiffs Memorandum in
Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment and considering the evidence presented

{

at oral argument, and good cause appearing, having made its ruling from the bench, and desiring to
set forth the Court's reasoning, the Court makes the following findings and conclusions and orders
as follows:
FINDINGS
1.

The Court finds that on or about March 14, 1972, Restrictive Covenants of
(

Highland Estates were recorded in the Summit County recorder's office amending the earlier
Conditions and Restrictions.
2.

The Court finds that on or about October 30, 1972, the Articles of

(

Incorporation of Highland Estates, were filed with the state of Utah, incorporating Highland Estates
as a non-profit corporation.
3.

The Court finds that subsequent to the filing of its Articles of Incorporation,

Highland Estates adopted Bylaws.
i
2
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4.

The Court finds that the Bylaws are unamibigous insofar as they set out a

procedure for amendment to Restrictive Covenants. Those procedures contemplate amendments to
be adopted at an annual meeting, and in the absence of a quorum at the annual meeting at a
reconvened meeting, at which no quorum would be necessary.
5.

The Court finds that the Restrictive Covenants of Highland Estates, as they

existed in 1996, do not expressly provide that amendment be adopted in the context of a meeting.
6.

The Courtfindsthat on or about August 23, 1994, attorney Scott Welling, on

behalf of Highland Estates, prepared a letter to each member of Highland Estates, stating that a copy
of the proposed Amendment to Declaration of Restrictive and Protective Covenants was attached to
the letter and a ballot to officially register each members vote of the proposed amendments to the
Restrictive Covenants.
7.

The Courtfindsthat Mr. Welling's letter, along with a ballot and a voting draft

of the Amendment to Declaration of Restrictions and Protective Covenants was delivered to the
members of Highland Estates.
8.

The Court finds that the Amendment to the Declaration of Restrictive and

Protective Covenants of Highland Estates was approved by a majority of homeowners through mailin ballots.

3
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9.

The Courtfindsthat the record supports the conclusion that the voting process

had integrity, that all votes were counted properly, and that a majority of homeowners did actually
vote in favor of the Amended Restrictive Covenants.
CONCLUSIONS
1.

Based upon the record before the Court, there are insufficient facts and

insufficient grounds to, as a matter of law, determine that the plaintiffs are inappropriate parties to
bring this action.
2.

As a matter of law, the actions taken by the trustees of Highland Estates that

led to the adoption of the Amended Restrictive Covenants was proper.
3.

The Court concludes as a matter of law that the mail-in ballot voting procedure

substantially complied with the Bylaws and Restrictive Covenants in place and that no prejudice to
the homeowners of Highland Estates occurred as a result of mail-in balloting.
i

Based upon the aforesaid, the Court now makes the following ORDER, JUDGMENT
ANDDECREE:
I.

The defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby granted in part and

<

denied in part as follows:
A.

All of plaintiffs' claims set forth in plaintiffs' Complaint relating to the

conduct of the members of the Board of Trustees of Highland Estates in the manner in which the

i
4
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Amendment to Declaration of Restrictive and Protective Covenants was voted on and approved are
hereby dismissed with prejudice.
B.

Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment as it relates to all other

claims in plaintiffs' Complaint is hereby denied.
DATED this the ^ Q

dayop&S(g98.
BY THE COURT:

^x^"""''////,,

T^^4#g%
Honorable Ronald E. Nehrif g?f
X^fhir ^ 1
District Court Judge
| § Cru
§o ^

% \ °«*y m
%fO//Onit\\\\\^

Approved as to Form:

'V.:^ . ^

E. Jay Sheen
Attorney for Plaintiffs

•'''.'iii!;:'.!"

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that on this 2J^ day of March, 1998,1 did mail, first class mail,
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5
MR. SHEEN: Jay Sheen for thePlaintiffs,
6 Jean Levanger.
7
MR. BELNAP: Paul Belnap and Burt Ringwood
8 for Highland Estates, Your Honor.
9
THE COURT: Counsel, the Court in preparation
10 for today's hearing requested that the file be brought
11 from Coalville to this Court. (Indicating) This is the
12 third volume of at least three volumes in this case,
13 and this volume does not contain the pleadings. The
14 Court is telling you that because I have not read the
15 pleadings in connection with today's hearing. There
16 are none to read. And when I arrived at court this
17 morning and realized that, we made a request for the
18 file to be delivered to us from Coalville. But we just
19 simply have a logistics problem and that did not occur.
20 I propose that you proceed with argument, you take some
21 time in educating the Court. Then if you want to have
22 the Court take the matter under advisement and read the
23 pleadings, I'll do that. And if the Court feels that
24 it's sufficiently educated and enlightened on the
25 issues regarding today's hearing, then the Court will

ORh

4 JEAN LEVANGER,

JVNI

«

(PROCEED^S)

2
THE COURT: Levanger versus Vincent, et al,
3 97-011.
Third District Court C v (
pv

l^ll

3

Page 3 1

1 rule from the bench. We'll play it as we can.
2
MR. SHEEN: Okay.
3
THE COURT: Let's proceed.
4
MR. SHEEN: Your Honor, I provided courtesy
5 copies to the Court on Monday.
6
THE COURT: where did you bring them?
7
MR. SHEEN: They were hand-delivered to your
8 Third District Court office.
9
THE COURT: That's the problem. I haven't
10 been in that court to do business for some time, and
11 there's always some kind of a problem in the paperwork
12 catching up with the Judge when we rotate into Summit
13 County.
14
MR. SHEEN: All right.
15
THE COURT: It simply is not going to be
16 where either party will be prejudiced. Let's proceed
17 with the hearing, and then we'll decide at the
18 conclusion of the argument how you want to proceed in
19 light of the pleadings.
20
MR. SHEEN: okay, thank you, Your Honor.
21
Jay Sheen for the the Levangers, Your Honor.
22 This is our motion. It's a motion to reconsider the
23 granting of the summary judgment motion which was
24 entered by Judge Ron Nehring.
25
Your Honor —
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1
THE COURT: Let me ask right off: Why don't
1 conducting the balloting for amending the CC&R's and
2 we ask Judge Nehring to hear that if it's a motion to
2 their subsequent approval and recording.
3 reconsider on the ruling that he made?
3
Your Honor, at that time we did not have
4
MR. SHEEN: I'm happy to do that, Your Honor,
4 certain material evidence which has since come to
5 whatever the Court would desire. What I understood was 5 light, and that's the reason for our motion to
6 that the Summit County rotation was very strict and
6 reconsider here today.
7 that you weren't allowed to request the judge who had
7
We sought the ballots that were created
8 left the bench on the matter. In other words, cases
8 during the process of voting on the amended CC&R's
9 didn't follow judges.
9 through discovery. We were denied those. That was
10
THE COURT: To the contrary. Whenever it is
10 objected to. Since then Miss Levanger, in connection
11 logical that a judge maintain the continuity of the
11 with her becoming a Member of the Board of Trustees of
12 case after rotating off of the calendar, we do that.
12 the Association sought extrajudicially and obtained
13 If this were a matter of first impression inspite of
13 from the President of the Association copies of the
14 the fact that many other hearings and many other orders 14 ballots. The ballots now indicate in their exhibit
15 had occurred in this case, the fact that you're asking
15 that we filed along with this motion and memorandum,
16 me now to second-guess my predecessor puts this Court 16 Your Honor, and they are contained — they are also
17 in a very awkward situation.
17 described in Miss Levanger's affidavit which she has
18 filed in connection with this matter.
18
MR. BELNAP: Your Honor, we are willing to do
19 whatever you would direct, obviously, but I don't think 19
The ballots indicate that the votes were
20 the motion is asking this Court to second-guess the
20 miscounted pursuant to the specific provisions of the
21 substance of the ruling. It's really a procedural
21 Bylaws of the Association. Joint tenant owners of
22 issue that they are talking about as I understand the
22 property have the number of votes divided by the number
23 arguments, Your Honor.
23 of joint tenant owners. So for a man and wife, for
24 example, the husband would have half a vote and the
24
THE COURT: All right. Let's proceed and see
25 wife would have half a vote. On 46 of the ballots
25 where it takes us.
Page 6
1
MR. SHEEN: Well, Your Honor, if the motion
2 is granted, the summary judgment would be reheard, so
3 there is that factor to consider. But I'm, along with
4 Mr. Belnap, happy to do whatever the Court requests.
5
THE COURT: Is it true that at some time
6 prior to today's date Judge Ron Nehring heard a motion
7 in this matter, made a ruling and now you are asking
8 this Court to reconsider the ruling that Judge Nehring
9 made?
10
MR. SHEEN: Yes.
11
THE COURT: All right. Let's proceed.
12
MR. SHEEN: Thank you.
13
Your Honor, we find ourselves here — the
14 Plaintiffs have filed a complaint against the
15 homeowners association alleging that they had
16 improperly approved and filed and recorded and had
17 CC&R's for the association. There were other claims
18 made in the complaint. It is a multiple claim
19 complaint. But on that particular issue, Judge Nehring
20 granted a summary judgment motion.
21
THE COURT: For whom?
22
MR. SHEEN: For the Defendant, Highland
23 Estates Homeowners Association on the basis that, with
24 the evidence in front of the Court, the homeowners
25 association had acted properly in its methods in
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1 cast, the written ballots cast, there was a single
2 joint tenant voting, and yet they were all counted as
3 whole votes in direct violation of Section 2.5 of the
4 Bylaws of the Association.
I
5
Furthermore, we obtained an affidavit, again,
6 after thefilingof the — I mean, after the entry of
7 the order granting the motion for summary judgment. We
8 filed an affidavit from Mr. Michael Ferino [phonetic],
9 who is the current President of the Association and a
10 member of the Board of Trustees of the Association, in
11 which he specifically denies having received notice of
j
12 any voting, of any balloting for the amending of CC&R's
13 when that was conducted. And that goes directly to the
j
14 heart of the propriety, of the method, by which the
!
15 Association obtained these votes.
|
16
Judge Nehring - a substantial portion of
17 Judge Nehring's ruling was based on an affidavit from
18 Mr. Welling that each homeowner had received personal
19 hand-delivery of the notice. And the reason for that,
20 Your Honor - I need to step back to educate the Court
21 just a little. As you read the pleadings, you'll
22 understand this. But let me explain it for purpose of
23 my oral argument. There is no method under Utah law by
24 which written ballots are allowed. In fact, Utah law
25 requires that either a meeting be held or that

Page 5 - Page 8
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Page 9
1 unanimous consent be obtained for corporate action. In
2 this case the Association, on its own, determined that
3 it would seek written ballots, the excuse being that
4 they could not get enough homeowner interest to approve
5 amending CC&R's, and so they did it by way of written
6 ballots. The written ballot had a deadline for voting
7 in it, in the notice accompanying the ballot. That
8 deadline was passed, and there was insufficient votes
9 cast before the deadline. And so the date was then
10 arbitrarily extended until the Board of Trustees felt
11 that there were sufficient votes.
12
Given that ad hoc process the Association had
13 basically created on the fly, Judge Nehring indicated
14 that with Mr. Welling's affidavit, that every homeowner
15 had received notice, and with the ballot indication
16 that - the indication from the Homeowners Association,
17 the ballots had been accumulated and counted and
18 exceeded the majority necessary, that that was an
19 allowable corporate action by the association.
20
Well, now we have evidence of two very
21 important things: Michael Ferino's Affidavit indicates
22 that he did not receive notice directly calling into
23 contention the Affidavit of Mr. Welling. Now, at the
24 time of the previous hearing, Your Honor, we didn't
25 have any information about Mr. Ferino's knowledge.

Page 11 |
1 either one or both of those bases, that is the faulty
2 counting of the joint tenant votes and the failure to
I
3 keep a record of the shareholders entitled to notice
j
4 and to vote in the process, the balloting process was
|
5 fatally flawed as was the notice process.
I
6
Now, the Association elected to create these
|
7 ad hoc rules. It's absolutely critical that they be
j
8 required to follow them to the letter. Judge Nehring's
9 analysis went something like this, Your Honor: He said
10 if everyone received notice and everyone had an
11 opportunity to consider the issue and the - and the
12 votes then cast were in a sense proxy votes, we can
13 consider them perhaps in some argument to be proxy
14 voted rather than this balloting process, then he says,
15 the integrity of the process remeans. Well, we have
16 evidence now that the process did not have integrity
17 from the very beginning. Now, they chose to follow
18 these ad hoc rules. They have to comply strictly with
19 the notice requirement, that is every member must
20 receive notice. We have evidence that they did not.
21
Frankly, Your Honor, when we argued this
22 motion before Judge Nehring, I indicated to the Court
23 and we actually indicated in written papers that
24 Mr. Welling's Affidavit fails on its face. There is no
25 evidence in Mr. Welling's Affidavit as to how he would

Page 10
1 Mr. Ferino became President of the Association and a
2 Member of the Board and then became interested in its
3 affairs and educated himself as to the extent of the
4 present action before the Court. And it was only after
5 he had educated himself as to various issues that he
6 met with the Levangers and indicated that the — that
7 he had never received this notice. Once that came to
8 light, he graciously agreed to file an affidavit on
9 that on that score.
10
So we have filed additional affidavits which
11 were not - which represent testimony that was not
12 available at the time of the motion for summary
13 judgment. We have filed the Affidavit of Miss Levanger
14 in which she indicates the ballots that are attached
15 have been reviewed and the indication from the records
16 of the Association are that the 46 homeowners
17 improperly voted.
18
There's an additional issue, Your Honor,
19 which represents a number of shares, as well, votes of
20 persons who were not members of the Association at the
21 time notice was given, but became members through
22 purchase of property thereafter and were still allowed
23 to vote on the proposition. And their votes were cast,
24 and you'll find all that in the memorandum. That
25 represents a significant number of shares, as well. On

Page 12
1 have personal knowledge that every single homeowner
2 received hand-delivery of these documents that he
3 claims. Mr. Welling was the attorney for the
4 Association. He gives no indication in his affidavit
5 that he went door to door or that he even knows who
6 didn't go door to door for the hand-delivery. So his
7 affidavit failed on its face. It failed at the last
8 hearing, but certainly now in the face of Mr. Ferino's
9 affidavit. You have to understand, Your Honor, we are
10 not talking about people who are now outside of the
11 process, disgruntled members as the Defendants would
12 have us believe and argued strenuously with Judge
13 Nehring. These people are the President of the
14 Association, a Member of the Board of Trustees.
15 Miss Levanger is also the Secretary of the Association.
16 So these people have been elected by their peers, other
17 members in the Association, other homeowners to look
18 out for their interests. And they now understand the
19 legitimacy of the complaint that the Levangers have
20 made.
21
We were denied the information through the
22 discovery process. We continue to be denied
23 information today, Your Honor. There's a continual
24 pattern in the association to not educate the
25 homeowners when reasonable requests are made for
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1 information. And there is a continuing pattern of the
2 Association acting in an ad hoc manner.
! 3
Your Honor, recently the Association — to
I 4 give you two examples: Recently the association had
! 5 determined and wrote a letter to the homeowners, that
j 6 is the Board of Trustees, indicating that they would
| 7 not operate under the newly amended Bylaws until the
8 controversy was settled. Well, in the interim from the
9 date of that announcement they have then attempted in a
10 meeting — certain members of the Board of Trustees
II indicated to the rest of the Board that they were
12 operating under the new Bylaws and that they were now
13 going to remove Mr. Ferino apparently for his
14 willingness to sign the affidavit and turn over the
15 information. And it was only after apparent discussion
16 among Counsel that that action was rescinded and not
17 taken. But they intended to fully do that. So, again,
18 they simply operate in an ad hoc fashion.
19
Let me deal briefly with - reply to their
20 arguments that they make in their Memorandum in
21 Opposition, and I'll be done, Your Honor. If you have
22 any questions, feel free.
23
They raise two points in their opposing
24 memorandum: The first point is that we have to
125 establish that the information was not available to us.

;
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1 And if we can't establish that, then the motion to
2 reconsider fails because the evidence was there and
[ 3 available and we simply didn't get it. Well, that
4 argument puts them in an interesting bind, Your Honor,
| 5 because they objected formally to the production of
! 6 those ballots. Now, they say we could have filed a
[ 7 motion to compel. They are assuming that that motion
! 8 to compel would - they would have then have not
I 9 resisted the motion to compel or it would have been
110 granted in which case their objection is not
11 well-founded. Now, they can't have it both ways. They
12 can't say, "We deny you the information, but had you
13 sought it we would have given it to you because our
14 denial was not well-founded. And by the way today
15 you're too late in seeking this reconsideration because
16 the evidence was there and available to you."
17
The second point is the affidavits, Your
18 Honor. We had no information from Mr. Ferino until he
19 became involved in the management of the homeowners
20 association regarding any of these matters. And I
21 guess their argument is that we should have gone out
22 and canvassed the entire neighborhood and found out
23 what everybody knew about every single thing that could
24 come into play. Well, Mr. Ferino became President
25 after the fact, after these matters were taken care of

Page 16
1
And I believe I've stated our case, and I
2 think after you review the information that we have
3 provided, including unfortunately the rather lengthy
4 exhibits, our motion will be granted. Thank you.
5
THE COURT: Thank you, Counsel.
6
MR. BELNAP: May it please the Court and
7 Counsel, Your Honor I ask leave of the Court to be able
8 to split our argument, if it's deemed necessary by the
9 Court, between procedural issues that I would like to
10 address and then Mr. Ringwood - if Your Honor wants to
11 hear on the merits of our objection to this motion to
12 reconsider — has some case authority to address on
13 that issue. Knowing what the Court knows at this
14 juncture of the hearing, let me make two observations,
15 and then Counsel are all invited to proceed as you deem
16 appropriate. The purpose, in the Court's opinion, to
17 have a judge review his or her own ruling is to avoid
18 inconsistent decisions. And it also has an element of
19 judicial economy that all of us are interested in
20 fostering.
21
There are a number of questions that I have
22 noted by way of notes as I've listened to Counsel's
23 argument. I'm asking rhetorically whether or not there
j24 was a motion made by Plaintiffs' Counsel to continue
(25 the summary judgment hearing because discovery was not
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1 and educated himself after the fact, and his evidence
2 is compelling. This is all material ~ very material
3 evidence.
4
The second argument they make, Your Honor, is
5 that the balloting process was not flawed. They
6 completely ignore in their argument Section 2.5 of the
7 Bylaws, which is very, very specific and details the
8 number of votes to grant each joint tenant in a joint
9 tenancy. And they refer, instead, to the generic state
10 law regarding ownership and joint tenancy and voting by
11 owners in a joint tenancy. Well, that's superseded by
12 the very specific provisions of the Bylaws.
13
Now, they turn their previous argument on its
14 head, Your Honor. Previously they argued because there
15 was nothing — I am sorry. They argued that the
16 statutes that we outlined previously, that is you can
17 only conduct business by meeting, a duly called
18 meeting, notice, with a quorum present or by unanimous
19 written consent. In their prior arguments before Judge
20 Nehring, they argued that those provisions should not
21 control and that the Association should be allowed to
22 do whatever it wants. Now they are arguing that the
23 very specific provisions of the Bylaws should not
24 control and rather the statutes should control in this
25 instance. Your Honor, they can't have it both ways.

Page 13 -Page 16
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1 complete.
2
MR. BELNAP: There was not, Your Honor.
3
THE COURT: I am also asking rhetorically
4 whether or not there was a motion to compel on the
5 discovery that was outstanding?
6
MR. BELNAP: There was not, Your Honor.
7
THE COURT: I'm also asking whether or not
8 any of the evidence that has now been brought to this
9 Court's attention was available with reasonable
10 diligence to present to the Court at the time the
11 summary judgment motion was heard?
12
MR. BELNAP: It was available, Your Honor, or
13 could have been asked and brought up and it was not.
14 And I could lay a very brief groundwork on that, Judge.
15
THE COURT: Do you understand where the Court
16 is coming from?
17
MR. BELNAP: I do. That's why I say this is
18 a procedural issue in our opinion and doesn't get to
19 the merits, doesn't need to go there to have this Court
20 revisiting what Judge Nehring's analysis was.
21
THE COURT: Well, if, in fact, I have a
22 degree of comfort in your position at the conclusion of
23 the argument, that's — that may well be the way the
24 Court is going to rule. But if there's any question
25 about that, it appears to the Court that Judge Nehring
Page 18
1 who made the original ruling on summary judgment,
2 should be the one who reviews the propriety of his
3 ruling.
4
MR. BELNAP: Okay.
5
THE COURT: Not this Court.
6
MR. BELNAP: All right. I understand.
7
THE COURT: You may proceed.
8
MR. BELNAP: Your Honor, this case, just by
9 way of brief background, arises out of a situation
10 where there's a subdivision here in the Summit County
11 Area called Highland Estates. And as part of that
12 subdivision, each person who has a home there is part
13 of the homeowners association. And the whole
14 controversy in this case arose out of the fact that the
15 Plaintiffs in this case did not like a decision that
16 was made by the homeowners association to make an
17 assessment to the homeowners to create a fund by which
18 they could have a rainy day fund so to speak and also a
19 fund to do certain improvements. And that seems to
20 have been at the core of the starting of this dispute.
21
The Levangers have participated over the
22 years in meetings. When they didn't get their way,
23 they decided the best way to participate was not to
24 participate in meetings. Then a change of decision was
25 made, and Becky Levanger, one of the Plaintiffs in this
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1 case, decided, "Okay, I am going to get involved." She
2 ran for office in the homeowners association and was
3 elected, and thus got herself in a position where she
4 could be involved in the governance of this group of
5 laypeople that are trying to run their homes and their
6 homeowners association.
7
This case was then filed by the Levangers
8 claiming under Rule 23 that this was a derivative
9 action on the behalf of all of the homeowners against
10 the homeowners association. So they, in essence, were
11 suing themselves.
12 - We came before this Court September 30th,
13 last year, 1997, before Your Honor in Coalville. What
14 brought us before the Court at that time was a motion
15 for a restraining order and an injunction. And we had
16 a hearing before, Your Honor. And at that hearing Your
17 Honor denied the Plaintiffs' motions for a restraining
18 order and an injunction which was asking to enjoin the
19 Association and the governance of the Association and
20 to have things done the way the Levangers wanted it
21 done.
22
Your Honor, at that hearing in denying that
23 motion said a couple of things: Number one, these
24 people need to get on with their lives, meaning the
25 homeowners. They need to get on with life and try to
Page 20
1 run their affairs in a way that's productive. That you
2 weren't trying to tell them how to do. That you were
3 simply encouraging that from the bench.
4
As part of that process, Your Honor set a
5 trial date in this case for January 19th and 20th of
6 this year. Before that hearing, in September, written
7 discovery was propounded, among other things, asking
8 for these ballots. Now, what brings these ballots into
9 play, Judge, and what was significant in Judge
10 Nehring's mind about it, without getting into the
11 merits, is that Judge Nehring decided what's important
12 in his mind is what is going to foster the most ability
13 for people to step forward and express their views.
14 What had happened in the past is people didn't show up
15 for meetings. And the governing papers had a provision
16 if they didn't have enough of a quorum, they could then
17 do a reconvened meeting, and those that showed up at
18 the reconvened meeting could then transact business.
19 Well, at reconvened meetings there was very few people
20 there, and so you had a situation where there wasn't a
21 voice, a good cross-section voice of the association.
22 So a decision was made to amend the documents and allow
23 for decisions to be made by a balancing process. And
24 Judge Nehring went through an analysis as part of his
25 ruling that that balloting process fostered
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1 participation and fostered exactly what the l a w and the
2 rules of substantial compliance should b e fostering,
3 and that is participation.
4
It is that balloting process that w a s at
5 issue, in part, at the time of the motion. That w a s on
6 the table from d a y one. Written discovery w a s served
7 April 19, ' 9 7 , b y the Plaintiff asking for, among other
8 things, each of the ballots. W e objected to that
9 discovery because it w o u l d subject the people w h o
10 turned in ballots to harassment. T h e Levangers —
11
Your Honor?
12
THE COURT: if there is going to b e any
13 demonstration in this courtroom, I will order anyone
14 w h o participates in that removed from the courtroom.
15
A VOICE: I a m sorry.
16
THE COURT: We are in a formal dignified
17 proceeding. The Court will not tolerate for one m o m e n t
18 a n y unbecoming behavior.
19
MR. SHEEN: Your Honor, I apologize for that
20 reaction.
21
THE COURT: The apology is accepted. N o

22 harm, no foul. Let's proceed.
23
MR. BELNAP: Thank you. It w a s felt b y the
24 homeowners association, o u r client, as authorized b y
25 the representatives, o u r client, the spokesman that w e
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1 to trial. W e were ready for trial. These were
2 received after the order w a s tendered, after it w a s
3 signed. N o w , w e d o n ' t think they are relevant, and
4 M r . Ringwood can speak to that. W e d o n ' t think it
5 changes anything. M r . Ringwood could speak to that.
6 But, procedurely, there w a s nothing, a n d still remains
7 nothing, w h y that hearing shouldn't have gone forward,
8 w a s not objected to b y Counsel for the Plaintiff on a n y
9 basis and that ruling should stand.
10
What resulted from that hearing — and I have
11 a transcript that should be part of the C o u r t ' s
12 original file - w a s a suggestion b y Counsel for the
13 Plaintiff that this matter b e certified since, to use
14 his words, the guts of his case h a d been ruled upon.
15 W e felt that Judge N e h r i n g ' s ruling h a d resolved all
16 issues, b u t there w a s a difference of opinion that he
17 d i d n ' t want to try and sort out that day. A n d what w a s
18 agreed and suggested b y Plaintiffs' Counsel w a s that h e
19 get a 5 4 B Certification, that w e go u p on this issue
20 that h a d been ruled on, w e let the appellate court
21 decide if Judge Nehring w a s right, because if he's
22 right, the case is over. If h e ' s wrong, then w e are
23 back here on some evidentiary issues, perhaps. O r I
24 should s a y some legal issues directing h i m with respect
25 to the a m e n d m e n t process, et cetera. I'll w r a p u p in
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1 one minute, Y o u r Honor.
1 deal with, that that w o u l d potentially subject those
2
That being the case, Judge, w e believe that
2 people w h o p u t in confidential ballots to individual
3
procedurally
this motion is not proper. M r . Ringwood
3 harassment and so it w a s objected to. A conversation
4 can indicate to y o u w h y - if Y o u r Honor wants to deal
4 took place after that between Counsel, and M r . Sheen
5 with it — w h y the vote of a j o i n t tenant in a joint
5 indicated, "Well, I m a y have to file a motion to
6 tenancy is sufficient to count for the joint tenant
6 compel." W e said, "Fine, whatever y o u think y o u need
7 owners of the property. A n d that's the heart of what
7 to do." N o motion w a s filed. W e came before this
8 they are concerned about.
8 Court in September, nothing w a s said, nothing w a s
9
With respect to the t w o affidavits that were
9 brought forward. This Court set a trial date. W e came
10 tendered after the hearing, after the order w a s signed,
10 before Judge Nehring January 9th on our motion for
11 there are some people saying, "I d o n ' t remember getting «
11 s u m m a r y judgment. Nothing w a s said. N o Rule 5 6
12 this." B u t that — where are all the other people?
12 affidavit w a s filed, n o motion t o compel, n o claim
13 A n d all Judge Nehring said is that the process fosters
13 whatsoever that all of the materials they needed or
14 participation. That's what he said.
14 wished to have were n o t before the Court.
15
THE COURT: Tell the Court the status of the
15
T h e motion w a s argued on January 9th, and w a s
16 granted. M r . Sheen w a s to prepare a 5 4 B Certification. 16 54 Certification.
(
MR. BELNAP: The Plaintiff has m o v e d in the
17 W e were to prepare the order with the findings. W e did 17
18 alternative today for 5 4 B Certification in accordance
18 so. It w a s submitted to Judge Nehring and signed.
19 After that order w a s entered, M i s s Levanger, because of 19 with what they suggested b e done at the hearing in
20 her position on the Board and M r . Ferino, w h o h a d been 20 January. S o they've m o v e d to reconsider or in the
121 alternative for 5 4 B Certification. W e d o n ' t object to
21 elected through a normal voting process and balloting,
{
122 the 5 4 B Certification. W e anticipated it would be
22 decided that they were going to turn over these private
23 made. Judge Nehring felt it w a s a very appropriate
23 ballots to Counsel for the Plaintiff. A n d so these
24 case to do that. W e think that is the direction this
24 were received after the hearing, which w a s a hearing, I
25 might remind the Court, t w o weeks before w e were to go 25 case ought to take as greed upon in the record.
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1
THE COURT: Anything you'd like to say?
2
MR. RINGWOOD: I'm happy to address the joint
3 tendency issue if Your Honor would like?
4
THE COURT: In the Court's opinion, the
5 hearing is focused on procedural and not subjective
6 issues.
7
Anything further anybody else would like to
8 say before the Court rules? Do you submit?
9
MR. SHEEN: Yes, Your Honor.
10
THE COURT: Regarding the Plaintiff's motion
11 to reconsider the granting of summary judgment in
12 behalf of Highland Estates Properties, the Owners
13 Association, Inc, the Court finds and rules as follows:
14
The record is undisputed that at the time
15 summary judgment was argued and granted, there was no
16 request by Plaintiffs for a continuance in order to
17 conduct additional discovery; secondly, there was no
18 motion to compel discovery either prior to or at the
19 time of the motion for summary judgment; and, three, it
20 is undisputed that evidence relating to what is now
21 offered as newly discovered evidence was, in fact,
22 available to the Plaintiffs at the time summary
23 judgment was argued and granted.
24
The Court finds that procedurally the
25 Plaintiffs had an opportunity to either conduct

1
MR. BELNAP: Like the 23rd?
2
THE COURT: Are you on pleasure or business?
3
MR. BELNAP: Business.
4
THE COURT: October 28th, 5:00 p.m.
5
MR. BELNAP: Your Honor, also with respect to
6 the 54B Certification, I think that Counsel can
7 stipulate to that, and we could make that part of 8
THE COURT: Part of the order?
9
You so stipulate?
10
MR. SHEEN: Yes, I do, Your Honor. I'd like
11 to take care of it rather than going back to Judge
12 Nehring to get him to sign the order.
13
THE COURT: In the desire of this Court to
14 minimize the expense and the inconvenience to the
15 litigants, it appears that that's the way to go;
16 include that in your order and then you may proceed
17 with any appellate remedies you desire on the
18 substantive issues of that motion. That way none of
19 the interests of the parties are compromized and you
20 may proceed on that basis.
21
MR. SHEEN: Thank you, Your Honor.
22
MR. BELNAP: Thank you, Judge.
23
THE COURT: We are in recess.
24
(Hearing adjourned.)
25
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1 additional discovery, compel discovery that was
1
REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE
2 STATE OF UTAH
)
2 outstanding and unresponded to or to seek a continuance
: SS.
3 for those purposes. Their failure to do so constitutes
3 County of Salt Lake )
4
I, Carlton S. Way, do certify that I am a
4 a waiver, and procedurally the Court finds that there
5 Certified Shorthand Reporter and Official Court
5 is simply no basis for the setting aside of the summary
6 Reporter in and for the State of Utah; that as such
6 judgment granted by Judge Nehring in behalf of the
7 reporter, I reported the occasion of the proceedings of
7 Defendants.
8 the above-entitled matter at the aforesaid time and
8
The Court, unless there is some objection by
9 place. That the proceeding was reported by me in
9 either side, will make no finding and no ruling on the
10 54 Certification question. If Judge Nehring acquiesced
10 stenotype using computer-aided transcription real-time
11 technology consisting of pages 1 through 28, inclusive.
11 in that process, then perhaps the thing for the parties
12 to do is to take the matter to the appellate court on
12
That the same constitutes a true and correct
13 the substantive issues.
13 transcription of the said proceedings.
14
The Plaintiff's motion to reconsider is
14
That I am not of kin or otherwise associated
15 denied. The Court has set forth the reasons. Counsel
15 with any of the parties herein or their counsel, and
16 for Defendant will prepare very specific findings
16 that I am not interested in the events thereof.
17 consistent with the ruling of the Court; prepare an
17
WITNESS my hand at Salt Lake, Utah, this 26th
18 accompanying order that is consistent with the
18 day of Janu«fyTl999.
J
19 findings; submit those documents to opposing counsel
20 for approval as to form; return them to this Court for
21 signature before 5:00 p.m, October the 21st.
22
MR. BELNAP: Your Honor, could we have just a
22
23 couple of more days? Mr. Ringwood and I are both going
23
24 to be out of town that entire week.
24
25
THE COURT: On pleasure or business?
25
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Deptfty Clerk, Sumx.it Caunty

Paul M. Belnap, #0279
H. Burt Ringwood, #5787
STRONG & HANNI
Attorneys for Defendant
Highland Estates Properties Owners Assoc.
Sixth Floor Boston Building
#9 Exchange Place
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801)532-7080
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SUMMIT COUNTY
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STATE OF UTAH

JEAN LEVANGER and REBECCA
LEVANGER,
Plaintiffs,
vs.

ORDER AND RULE 54(b)
CERTIFICATION

Civil No. 970300011

JOANN VINCENT, KEN FISHER, DIANE
DUPLANTY, RON DUPLANTY, JAN
NEMCIK, BECKY NELSON, ROSIE
PETRONELL, CORY ALSBERG, GERALD
VINCENT, SANDY FISHER, SCOTT
FEATHERSTONE, MARTIN ROGUSCHKA)
LANCE SWEDISH, LAUREL KANGAS,
JOHN DOES 1-5, JANE DOES 1-5, and
HIGHLAND ESTATES PROPERTIES
OWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC.,

Judge Pat Brian

Defendants.
The above-entitled matter came on for hearing on the 7,h day of October, 1998 on
plaintiffs Motion to Reconsider, with counsel of record for plaintiff appearing and counsel of
record for defendant appearing.
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The matter was argued to the Court and the Court being fully advised by counsel
concerning the issues involved, the Court made its ruling denying the plaintiffs motion. The
Court deems it appropriate to set forth the basis of this ruling as follows:
1. At the time the summary judgment hearing was argued and presented to Judge
Nehring, the above-entitled matter was scheduled to proceed to trial in less than two weeks
thereafter.
2. At the time of the summary judgment hearing, plaintiff did not request leave for
additional discovery or indicate that the matter was not ripe for decision at that juncture in the
case.
3. This Court finds that the documents which plaintiff attempts to now rely upon for
their Motion to Reconsider, procedurally are not appropriate to be submitted at this juncture of
the case. If plaintiff felt that the documents were potentially significant or important, plaintiff was
aware of the potential existence of the same, and of defendant's objection to production of the
documents for reasons stated in discovery responses. Plaintiff made no motion to compel the
production of the documents tendered to the court with the Motion to Reconsider and it is
undisputed that the evidence plaintiff now attempts to tender to the court with the Motion to
Reconsider was in fact available to be requested, to seek an order compelling the same, or to seek
leave from the court to have additional time to review the matter before the case was presented to
Judge Nehring for summary judgment argument just prior to the scheduled trial of the case.
Therefore, this court finds that procedurally the plaintiff had fair opportunity to conduct and
complete such discovery as plaintiffs felt necessary and appropriate or to compel production of
2
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such documents as plaintiffs felt appropriate. Plaintiffs' failure to do so constitutes a waiver of
the basis on which plaintiffs now seek reconsideration and procedurally there is no basis to set
aside the order of the Honorable Ronald E. Nehring granting the defendant summary judgment.
Following the ruling of the Court on Plaintiffs' Motion to Reconsider, counsel
addressed to the Court the issues surrounding the status of the case and plaintiffs' desire to have
the ruling of Judge Nehring reviewed by an appellate court. Based upon the arguments of
counsel, the agreement of counsel and this court's review of this matter, it is determined by this
Court and this Court so finds that there is not just reason for delay and the order of the Honorable
Ronald E. Nehring is hereby certified pursuant to Rule 54(b) for entry as a final Order and
judgment. It is the opinion of this Court, and counsel also have represented to this Court that it
was the opinion of Judge Nehring that it would be prudent to certify this order pursuant to Rule
54(b) since the ruling on the summary judgment substantially resolves the determinative issues in
the above-entitled action and if plaintiff chooses to appeal from the same, it would be a substantial
savings of judicial resources to have that appeal proceed now rather than proceeding through a
trial and then a subsequent appeal.
WHEREFORE, based upon the reasons set forth above, it is
HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that:
1. That Plaintiffs' Motion to Reconsider is hereby denied.
2. The Court certifies the Order of the Honorable Ronald E. Nehring dated May 28.
1998 as a final Order and Judgment pursuant to Rule 54(b), this Court determining that there is
3
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no just reason for delay and that a judgment should enter pursuant to said order.
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DATED this> j=dX2. day of-Becember,1998.
BY THE COURT:

Pat B\ Brian
Third District Court Judge
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Approved as to Form:

1_

E. Jay Sheen
Attorney for Plaintiff
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on t h i s A ^ day of December, 1998, a true and correct copy of
the foregoing Order and Rule 54(b) Certification was mailed, first class postage prepaid, to:
E. Jay Sheen
ROBINSON & SHEEN
77 West 200 South, Suite 420
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
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